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R E S U M E N
En esta Disertación Doctoral se analizan problemas económicos en la intersección de
las áreas de la Teoría de los Juegos, los Problemas de Emparejamiento y el Diseño de
Mecanismos. En particular, he trabajado en el análisis de problemas de emparejamiento
en esquemas descentralizados tales como Mercados de Trabajo, Problemas de Admi-
siones a la Universidad y Problemas Generales de emparejamiento. Recientemente, la
investigación sobre estos problemas ha ganado un importante impulso, tanto teórica
como empíricamente, debido al estudio de problemas cruciales que no ‘pueden ser
analizados bajo los paradigmas clásicos de oferta y demanda. En mi disertación analizo
dos problemas principales. Por un lado, hago un análisis de equilibrio de mecanismos
descentralizados de emparejamiento con agentes que tomas sus decisiones estratégi-
camente. Por otro lado, también analizo el problema clásico de emparejamiento en
presencia de externalidades, es decir, problemas de emparejamiento donde las prefer-
encias de los agentes dependen de todos los emparejamientos factibles entre agentes
y no solo del conjunto de potenciales parejas en un lado opuesto del mercado. Esta
disertación se compone de los siguientes tres capítulos, que en sí mismos constituyen
contribuciones independientes en esta área de la economía.
En el primer capítulo, titulado Incomplete Information and Costly Signaling in College
Admissions, analizo el problema de admisión a las universidades con información
incompleta acerca de las habilidades de los estudiantes. En este modelo considero,
que universidades con calidades observables y estudiantes con información privada
se emparejan de acuerdo con un mecanismo descentralizado donde los estudiantes
pueden señalizar sus habilidades con señales que son costosas. Bajo estas condiciones,
caracterizo un equilibrio simétrico separador del juego inducido por este mecanismo
en el cual se maximiza el número de emparejamientos y los mejores estudiantes se
matriculan en las mejores universidades. Esta caracterización del equilibrio permite
realizar diversos ejercicios de estática comparativa, en ellos se muestra que el cam-
bio de diversos parámetros del modelo afecta asimétricamente a los estudiantes. Por
ejemplo, un incremento en el número de estudiantes lleva a que aquellos de baja
cualificación reduzcan su inversión en señalización, mientras los de alta cualificación
podrían aumentarla. Se observan patrones similares cuando los estudiantes enfrentan
un incremento en el número de plazas escolares o un incremento en las calidades de
las universidades. Finalmente, se analizan las ganancias del proceso de señalización
comparando los pagos de equilibrio de este juego con uno en el que no hay señalización.
Entre otros resultados, encuentro que bajo ciertas distribuciones de las habilidades de
los estudiantes, una demanda suficientemente alta por las plazas de las universidades
llevaría a todos los colegios a tener ganancias positivas.
En el segundo capítulo, titulado Many-to-one Matching: externalities and Stability, se
analiza la existencia de asignaciones estables en problemas de emparejamiento con
externalidades. En este problema, los agentes no solo toman en cuenta sus parejas
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sino también las parejas de los demás agentes para determinar sus preferencias. Es
decir, el emparejamiento de los demás afecta la valoración que yo tengo de mi propio
emparejamiento. Una vez que estas externalidades se toman en cuenta, los agentes
forman expectativas sobre el conjunto de emparejamientos que ellos consideran ad-
misibles, dichas predicciones son llamadas estimation functions. Dado un conjunto de
estimation functions ϕ, un emparejamiento es ϕ-stable si este es admisible para todos los
agentes y no es bloqueado por ninguna coalición. Un primer resultado muestra que los
emparejamientos ϕ-stables podrían no existir. Aun más, se muestra que ningún con-
junto de estimation functions puede asegurar la existencia de emparejamientosϕ-stable.
Además se muestra que un emparejamiento ϕ-stable puede existir, en el caso en el
que todos los emparejamientos sean considerados admisibles por todos los agentes,
bajo una restrición de las preferencias de los agentes llamada bottom q-substitutability.
Finalmente, se analiza también una noción del core en esta clase de problemas de
emparejamiento con externalidades llamado el ϕ-core. Se demuestra que el ϕ-core y
el conjunto de emparejamientos ϕ-stables siempre coinciden independientemente del
conjunto de estimation functions ϕ.
Finalmente, en el tercer capítulo, titulado A Simple Decentralized Matching Mechanism
in Markets with Couples, se analiza un mecanismo descentralizado de emparejamiento
muy simple llamado One Application Mechanism. Bajo este mecanismo, se puede sostener
en Equilibrio perfecto en Subjuego (SPE) cualquier emparejamiento estable del mercado.
Sin embargo, se encuentra que también es posible sostener emparejamiento inestables
en este tipo de equilibrio. Se muestra que solo un tipo muy especial de inestabillidad
es admisible en SPE, se argumenta que esta inestabilidad tiene su origen en fallas de
coordinación entre los miembros de una pareja. En mi principal resultado, se muestra
que el One Application Mechanism implementa en SPE el conjunto de emparejamientos
(pairwise) estables de mercados de emparejamiento con parejas. . .
A B S T R A C T
This dissertation involves the analysis of economic problems in the intersection of
the fields of Game theory, Two-sided Matching and Mechanism Design. In particular,
I work on decentralized two-sided matching problems such as job markets, college
admissions, marriage problems, etc. In recent years, these economic problems have
become crucial, both theoretically and empirically, since there are many important
real-world markets where the traditional supply-demand paradigm cannot be applied.
My disertation includes the analysis of two main problems. On the one hand, I con-
sider the equilibrium analysis of decentralized matching mechanisms with strategic
decision makers. On the other hand, I also analyze two-sided matching problems with
externalities where agents’ preferences depend on the complete assignment between
workers and firms, students and colleges, etc. and not only on the set of agents on the
opposite side of the market. The dissertation consists of the following three chapters
that constitute independent contributions in this area.
In the first chapter, entitled Incomplete Information and Costly Signaling in College
Admissions, I analyze a problem of college admissions with incomplete information
about student skills. Colleges with observable qualities and students with private
information are matched according to a decentralized mechanism where students can
signal their abilities with costly observable signals. I characterize a separating sym-
metric equilibrium of this game where the number of potential matches is maximized
and the best students enroll at the best colleges. My closed form characterization
allows to conduct meaningful comparative statics analyses. I show that the effect of a
change in the underlying parameters of the model is not symmetric across students.
For instance, an increase in the number of students leads the low skilled students to
decrease the investment in signaling while the high skilled applicants may increase
it. Similar patterns arise when students face a change in the number of school places
or college qualities. Finally, I analyze the gains of the signaling process by comparing
equilibrium payoffs between this separating equilibrium and a pooling equilibrium
with no signaling. Among other results, I show that under certain distributions of the
student skills, a large enough demand for school places leads all colleges to get positive
gains.
In the second chapter, entitled Many-to-one Matching: externalities and Stability, I ana-
lyze the existence of stable assignments in matching problems with externalities. In this
setting, agents not only care about whom they are matched with but also the partners
of the others. Once externalities are considered, agents form expectations on the set of
matchings that they consider admissible, such predictions are called estimation functions.
Given a set estimation functions ϕ, a matching is ϕ-stable if it is admissible for every
agent and not blocked by any coalition. I show that a ϕ-stable matching may not exist.
Further, no set of estimation functions assures the existence of ϕ-stable matchings. In
the case where all matchings are considered admissible for every agent, a ϕ-stable
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matching exists under a restriction on agents’ preferences called bottom q-substitutability.
Finally, I analyze a notion of the core in matching problems with externalities called
the ϕ-core. I find that the ϕ-core and the set of ϕ-stable matchings always coincides for
any given set of estimation functions ϕ.
Finally, in the third chapter, entitled A Simple Decentralized Matching Mechanism in
Markets with Couples, I analyze a simple decentralized matching mechanism called One
Application Mechanism. Under this mechanism any stable matching of the market can
be achieved in Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (SPE). However, I find that the mechanism
may achieve also unstable matchings in SPE. I show that only one special kind of
instability is admissible in equilibrium. Further, I argue that this instability only comes
from coordination failures between members of couples. My main result shows that the
One Application Mechanism implements in SPE the set of pairwise stable matchings
of markets with couples. . .
1
I N C O M P L E T E I N F O R M AT I O N A N D C O S T LY S I G N A L I N G I N
C O L L E G E A D M I S S I O N S
1.1 introduction
A decentralized college admissions process is associated with coordination problems.
This not only means that some agents may end up unmatched, but also that the
matching mechanism may be ineffective to assign the best students to the best colleges.
Not only the grade coordination among agents could explain these failures of the
matching process but also the presence of incomplete information. In real-world,
college qualities seem to be observable for all agents, but students’ abilities are rather
private information. Thus colleges with observable qualities may be indifferent among
many applicants depending on the available information about student abilities. These
indifferences may lead colleges to accept applicants already accepted by other colleges
and eventually remain unmatched at the end of the matching process.
The literature on this issue shows that some simple matching mechanisms can
alleviate the effects of coordination problems in matching problems with complete
information.1 A crusial characteristic of these mechanisms is that they try to exhaust
the possibility of matching agents in a stable fashion and under certain conditions
maximize the number of potential matches of the problem. Some of these matching
mechanisms assure the stability of equilibrium assignments by restricting students
to send only one application.2 However, when agents are allowed to send multiple
applications, unstable assignments may end up in equilibrium. According to Triossi
(2009), in this setting with multiple applications it is easy to restore the stability of
equilibrium assignments by introducing a small application cost in the process. But
even when the application cost is negligible, leading students to submit multiple
applications, some dynamic mechanisms result effective to achive stable assignments
in equilibrium.3 Thus, in college admissions with complete information, it is relatively
easy to guarantee the stability of equilibrium assignments and alleviate the problem of
coordination.
In contrast, in incomplete information environments, we require additional condi-
tions to alleviate the problem of coordination, since relevant characteristics of agents
are not observable any more. In this setting, the role of signaling seems to be crucial
to understand how colleges and students match each other in college admissions. For
instance, Coles, et. al. (2010) introduce a cost-free signaling mechanism in decentralized
matching problems with incomplete information about agents’ preferences. Among
other desirable properties, in equilibrium this mechanism increases the expected num-
1 These mechanisms are simple in the sense that they consist in only two stages. In the first stage, agents on
one side of the market send (simultaneously) a proposal to the agents on the opposite side of the market.
In the second stage, agents collect their offers and accept or reject (simultaneously) of of the available
proposals.
2 See Alcalde, Perez-Castrillo and Romero-Medina (1998) and Alcalde and Romero-Medina (2000).
3 See Sotomayor, 2003; Romero-Medina and Triossi, 2010; and Haeringer, G. and Wooders, M., 2011.
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ber of matches and the welfare of agents who signal their preferences. However, a
cost-free signaling mechanism is not very realistic in decentralized college admissions.
For instance, most selective colleges and universities in the US require a set of signals
to measure students’ abilities: the test scores of either the SAT or ACT,4 essay questions,
recommendation letters and personal interviews are the most important requirements.
Hence, a costly signaling model seems to be a correct approach to analyze this problem,
since a student has to spend significant amounts of effort (and money) in order have
better signals and improve his chance of enrolling at college.
In this chapter, we analyze a matching problem where students want to enroll at
colleges with observable qualities. Student abilities are private information, however
all agent know the prior distribution of student skills. In this setting, students want
to enroll at the best universities while colleges want to enroll high skilled students.
Agents are matched according to a simple decentralized matching mechanism called
Costly Signaling Mechanism (CSM) which runs in two stages. In the signaling stage,
students choose a costly observable score to signal their abilities. In the matching
stage, colleges and students are matched according to a simple two-stage matching
process. First, colleges simultaneously make one offer to a student; and after that,
students collect their offers and simultaneously choose one offer among the available
ones. The CSM induces an extensive form game that is characterized by an equilibrium
assignment and a signaling strategy.
In order to understand the effects of the presence of incomplete information in
college admissions, we analyze the benchmark matching problem with no signaling.
In this setting, all students are ex-ante identical, since colleges only know the prior
distribution of student abilities. Under these conditions, we characterize a symmetric
equilibrium of this game whose agents’ payoffs depend on the number of students, the
expected value of student skills and colleges’ qualities. This equilibrium has several
interesting implications. First of all, in equilibrium colleges expect to enroll average
students, since the matching process does not provide any additional information
about student abilities. Secondly, we find that the probability of enrolling a student
is decreasing in college qualities. Then only the highest quality college fills its school
seat with probability one while the rest of agents may end up unmatched with positive
probability. Finally, we also show that an increase in the number of students increases
colleges’ payoffs while students’ payoffs decrease.
Our main results regard with the analysis of a separating symmetric signaling
equilibrium of the game induced by the CSM where all students play according to
the same signaling strategy. To sustain this separating equilibria, we consider a set of
beliefs by which higher scored students are associated with higher abilities. Under
these beliefs, colleges form an interim ordinal preference relation on the set of students
by which they prefer to enroll higher scored students. This implies that for each profile
of student scores, there is a unique equilibrium assignment in the matching stage of the
CSM that is consistent with these beliefs. This equilibrium assignment is assortative, i.e.
the highest scored student is matched with the best college; the second highest scored
student is matched with the second best college; and so on.
4 The SAT (Scholastic Assessment Test) and the ACT (American College Testing) are the most important
standardized tests for college admissions in the USA.
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In the signaling stage of the CSM, students take as given the assortative assignment
of the matching stage and play a signaling game by choosing a costly observable score
to signal their abilities. We characterize a symmetric pure strategy Nash equilibrium of
this game. This equilibrium is characterized by a strictly increasing and continuous
differentiable signaling strategy that depends on student skills. In equilibrium, no pair
of students choose the same score, then this symmetric signaling equilibrium induces a
unique equilibrium matching that is assortative with respect to the true student skills.
So we find that in this separating equilibrium, the highest skilled student is matched
with the best college; the second highest skilled student is matched with the second
best college; and so on. Further, in this equilibrium it is maximized the number of
potential matches and agents are induced to match efficiently in the sense that the best
students enroll at the best colleges.
Our closed form characterization allows to conduct meaningful comparative static
analyses. Our main result shows that the effect of a change in the underlying parameters
of the model is not symmetric across students, such effect depends on student abilities.
The first comparative statics exercise deals with the effect of a change in the number
of students. Intuitively, an increase in the number of competitors (students) should
decreases the probability of enrolling at college which leads students to decrease their
investment in signaling. However, our results show that this effect is not symmetric,
since a low skilled student has a decrease in this probability while a high skilled
student may has an increase. Thus an increase in the number of students leads the low
skilled students to decrease the investment in signaling while the high skilled students
may increase it.
This result is useful to explain an interesting empirical fact observed in real-world
college admissions. In the US is observed a decline in the mean SAT scores as the
participation rate increases.5 According to the College Board,6 the mean SAT scores
declines because more students of varied academic backgrounds are represented in
the pool of test-takers. It is clear that this interpretation only considers the positive
correlation between the SAT and students abilities to argue that an increase in the
number of applicants systematically decreases the proportion of good test-takers in
population. Our results suggest an alternative explanation based on the underlying
signaling game of the problem. According to our model, an increase in the number of
competitors not only leads low skilled students to decrease the investment in signaling
but also increases the proportion of people who decide to do it. Then an increase in the
number of competitors will eventually lead students to reduce the average investment
in signaling with no change in the underlying distribution of student skills.
We also analyze the effect of a change in the number of school places and a change
in college qualities. These two experiment have very similar implications, and as in
the previous case, the effect of these experiments is not symmetric across students. In
particular, we show that an increase in the number of school places (in college qualities)
leads low skilled students to increase the investment in signaling while the high skilled
students may decrease it.
5 California Postsecundary Education Commission (CPEC), “SAT Scores and Participation Rate” at
http://www.cpec.ca.gov/StudentData/50StateSATScores.asp.
6 “43% of 2011 College-Bound Senior Met SAT College and Career Readness Benchmark”
at http://press.collegeboard.org/releases/2011/43-percent-2011-college-bound-seniors-met-sat-college-
and-career-readiness-benchmark
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Finally, we analyze the gains of the CSM which are defined in a natural way as
the difference in equilibrium payoffs between this separating signaling equilibrium
of the CSM and a symmetric equilibrium of the problem with no signaling. We show
that students’ gains are strictly increasing with respect to student skills. However, this
property of students gains does not guarantee to avoid potential losses. Further, it is
possible to show that under certain distributions of skills all students can get negative
gains.
Colleges’ gains depend on the expected values of order statistics. Thus, the analysis
of these gains is a difficult issue, since for most distributions there are no closed
form solutions for moments of order statistics. We analyze the particular case of
exponentially distributed skills that allows us to calculate a closed form solution
for colleges’ gains. Even when the exponential model is a very particular case, it
has interesting implications. First of all, colleges’ gains are monotonic increasing in
college qualities, i.e. the best colleges have the greatest gains. Second, colleges’ gains
are monotonic increasing in the number of students, i.e. all colleges benefit from an
increasing demand for school places. Finally, we show that a sufficiently large demand
for school places leads all colleges to get positive gains.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows; in Section 1.2, we describe the basic
model and definitions; in Section 1.3, we analyze the benchmark college admissions
problem with no signaling; in Section 1.4, we introduce the CSM and its equilibrium
characterization; in Section 1.5, we conduct our exercises of comparative statics; in Sec-
tion 1.6, we analyze the gains of the CSM; in Section 1.7, we present some conclusions
of the chapter. Finally, all proofs of this chapter are in appendix A.
1.2 the model
There are M ≥ 1 colleges and N students such that M ≤ N. Let C = {c1, c2, ..., cM}
denote the set of colleges with typical agent c ∈ C and let S = {s1, s2, ..., sN} denote
the set of students with typical agent s ∈ S. Each college c ∈ C is characterized by an
observable parameter vc > 0, which is interpreted as the quality of the college c. With
some abuse of notation, we use vj to denote the quality of the college cj. In order to
simplify, we usually say “the student i” instead of “the student si” and “the college j”
instead of “the college cj”. We assume without lost of generality (w.l.g) that colleges’
qualities satisfy the following condition, v1 ≥ v2 ≥ ... ≥ vM.
Each student s ∈ S is characterized by a parameter αs ∈ [0, w] that denotes his
skills or academic abilities. We say that a student s is more skilled than a student s′
whenever αs > αs′ . Students’ skills are private information, this implies that only the
student s ∈ S knows the realization of his own parameter αs. We assume that student
skills are independently and identically distributed on some interval [0, w] according
to a strictly increasing and continuous differentiable cumulative distribution function
F such that F (0) = 0 and F (w) = 1.7 The distribution F has a continuous density
f = F′ that satisfies f (α) > 0 for all α ∈ (0, w). All elements of the model are common
7 All results hold when students’ parameters are independently and identically distributed on the interval
[0,∞) according to a strictly increasing and continuous differentiable cumulative distribution function F
such that F (0) = 0 and limF (w) = 1 as w→ ∞.
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knowledge, i.e. the distribution of skills F; the number of students and colleges; and
colleges’ qualities.
1.2.1 The matching problem
For simplicity, we focus on the simplest one-to-one matching problem,8 i.e. each college
has only one available school seat. In this setting, an assignment is a matching between
colleges and students which is a mapping that specifies a partner for each agent,
allowing the possibility that some agents remain unmatched. Formally
Definition 1 A matching µ is a mapping from the set S ∪ C onto itself such that:
1. If µ (s) 6= s then µ (s) ∈ C;
2. If µ (c) 6= c then µ (c) ∈ S; and
3. µ (s) = c if and only if s = µ (c).
According to this definition, a student (college) with no partner is matched with
himself (itself). In order to simplify, each student (college) get an utility equal to the
quality (skills) of the partner. Let Us (µ) and Uc (µ) be the utilities of the student s and
the college c, respectively, under the matching µ. Then each student s ∈ S has a payoff,
Us (µ) =
{
vc if µ (s) = c.
0 Otherwise
(1)
Each college c ∈ C has a payoff,
Uc (µ) =
{
αs if µ (c) = s.
0 Otherwise
(2)
We normalize the utility of the prospect of remaining unmatched to zero for both
colleges and students.
In two-sided matching literature, a college admissions problem is described by a
three-tuple (S, C,), where S is a set of students, C is a set of colleges and = (s1
, ...,sN ;c1 , ...,cM) denotes a profile of ordinal preferences. In this problem, each
agent a ∈ S ∪ C has a complete, strict and transitive preference relation a over the set
of agents on the opposite side of the market and the prospect of remaining unmatched.
It is easy to see that each student s ∈ S has a preference relation s over the set of
colleges and the prospect of remaining unmatched C ∪ {s}, such that: a) c s s if and
only if vc > 0 and b) for all c, c′ ∈ C, it is satisfied that c s c′ if and only if vc > vc′ .
Since college qualities are observable, all students have identical ordinal preferences.
In a similar way, each college c ∈ C has a preference relation c on the set of students
and the prospect of having a position unfilled S ∪ {c}, such that: a) s c c if and only
if αs > 0 and b) for all s, s′ ∈ S, it is satisfied that s c s′ if and only if αs > αs′ . Let a
denote the weak preference relation associated with a for each agent a ∈ S ∪ C. Thus,
8 The model can be easily extended to many-to-one matching problems under the assumption that colleges
form responsive preferences (Roth and Sotomayor, 1991).
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for any c, c′ ∈ C , c s c′ implies either c s c′ or vc = vc′ . In a similar way, for any
s, s′ ∈ S, s c s′ implies either s c s′ or αc = αc′ .
A matching µ is individually rational whenever µ (a) a a for all a ∈ S ∪ C. A
student-college pair (s, c) such that µ (s) 6= c blocks the matching µ if, s c µ (c) and
c s µ (s). A matching µ is stable if it is individually rational and not blocked by any
student-college pair. Let E (S, C,) denote the set of stable matchings of the college
admissions problem (S, C,).
1.3 the benchmark problem : college admissions with no signaling
We analyze the benchmark problem of college admissions with no signaling and
incomplete information about student skills. In this setting, all students are ex-ante
identical, since colleges only know the prior distribution of student skills. So the
expected value of student abilities E [α] is the best estimation of student skills.
We consider that colleges and students are matched according to the following
simple decentralized matching mechanism in two stages.
1. Offers: Each college c ∈ C sends one message m (c) ∈ S ∪ {c}. If m (c) = s, then
the college c is making an offer to the student s. If m (c) = c, the college c is
making no offer. Let O (s) = {c ∈ C : m (c) = s} ∪ {s} be the set of offers to the
student s (note that a student always receives an offer from himself) ;
2. Hiring: Each student s ∈ S chooses one of his available offers in O (s).
Colleges and students play the game induced by this simple mechanism. In complete
information environments with strict preferences, Alcalde and Romero-Medina (2000)
show that this mechanism implements in Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (SPE) the set
of stable matchings of college admissions problems. Thus this class of decentralized
matching mechanisms exhausts the possibility of matching colleges and students in a
stable way.9 Further, under certain conditions on agents’ preferences,10 this mechanism
also maximizes the number of potential matches.
In the presence of incomplete information, these results do not hold any more. The
mechanism may has many equilibria depending on the available information about
student abilities and the grade of coordination among colleges. In this section, we
focus on two “natural” equilibria of the problem, with and without coordination
among colleges, whose characterization permit us to analyze the effects of the presence
of incomplete information and the problem of coordination in decentralized college
admissions. The explicit characterization of agents’ payoffs based on the number of
students and colleges; college qualities and student skills allows us to identify the effect
of a change in one of these parameters on equilibrium payoffs.
Before analyzing these equilibria, we argue that it is easy to characterize the equilib-
rium students’ behavior. Since college qualities are observable, at any possible equilibria
9 These results hold in problems where colleges have quotas of students providing colleges’ preferences are
responsive, see Roth and Sotomayor (1991).
10 When colleges have responsive preferences respect to individual preferences, the set of agent unmatched
and unfilled positions are the same at any stable matching (Roth and Sotomayor, 1990). This result implies
that this simple matching mechanism not only exhausts the possibility of matching agents in a stable way,
but also maximizes the number of potential matches when colleges have responsive preferences.
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students must choose the best offer among the available ones. It is clear that under
any alternative choice rule, students cannot get a better assignment. Then the rule
where students choose the best offer among the available ones is a dominant strategy
for students. We assume that colleges anticipate this optimal students’ behavior and
decide their offers. For simplicity, we label each student with one number from 1 to
N. These labels are observable for all agents and do not provide information about
student skills.
We analyze an equilibrium situation where colleges coordinate their actions based on
students’ labels. Consider a profile of strategies where students follow their dominant
strategy while each college cj sends one message to the student j. Let µ be the outcome
matching of this strategy profile. It is easy to verify that this assignment satisfies
µ
(
cj
)
= j for j = 1, ..., M while the rest of students remain unmatched, i.e. µ (j) = j for
j = M + 1, ..., N. Under this assignment, each college gets a payoff equal to E [α] while
students get a payoff equal to vj for j = 1, ..., M and zero otherwise. It is easy to show
that this profile of strategies is a SPE of this college admissions game. First of all, note
that no student has a profitable deviation, since students are following their dominant
strategy. Secondly, a college ck can deviate by sending a message to any alternative
student j 6= k. In this case, the college ck either will get matched with another student
j = k + 1, ..., N or will be rejected by another student j = 1, ..., k− 1. It is clear that this
deviation cannot be profitable, since all students are ex-ante identical. Further, note
that under this equilibrium, it is maximized the number of potential matches. This
equilibrium is well defined for any permutation of the set of students and further these
equilibria are payoff equivalent for colleges.
Now we consider an equilibrium of this game with no coordination among colleges.
We want to show that the profile of strategies where students choose the best offer
among the available ones and colleges make one offer to each student with equal
probability is a SPE of this college admissions game.
We consider a college admissions problem with M ≥ 1 colleges and N ≥ M students.
As before, we label each student with one number from 1 to N with no additional
information about student skills but the prior distribution. Assume that each college
sends one offer to each student with equal probability (i.e. 1N ), we want to show that
no college has a profitable deviation from this strategy. Consider that any college cj
with observable quality vj is planning to deviate from this strategy. Note that there
are j− 1 colleges with higher quality and M− j colleges with lower quality than the
college cj. Since college qualities are observable, an offer of this college cj always beats
any other offer of the M− j lower quality colleges. Then one offer of the college cj will
be accepted by a student i whenever every of the j− 1 higher quality colleges make
one offer to any of the other N − 1 students.
Thus the total number of combinations of offers from M− j colleges to N students
is NM−j while total number of combinations of offers from j − 1 colleges to N − 1
students is (N − 1)j−1. Since colleges do not coordinate, one offer of the college cj will
be accepted by the students i with probability:
(N − 1)j−1 NM−j
NM−1
=
(
N − 1
N
)j−1
for j = 1, ..., M. (3)
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Then by making an offer to the student i with probability 1N , the college cj will get
an expected payoff
(N−1
N
)j−1 E [α]. Note that this payoffs are independent of student
skills, since all students are ex-ante identical.
Now consider that the college cj is planning to deviate from this strategy by making
one offer to each student i with probability pi 6= 1N . It is easy to see that such deviations
cannot be profitable, since ∑Ni=1 p
∗
i
(N−1
N
)j−1 E [α] = ∑Ni=1 pi (N−1N )j−1 E [α] for any pi 6=
1
N such that ∑
N
i=1 pi = 1. Then the profile of strategies where colleges send one offer to
each student with equal probability is a symmetric SPE of this game. Note that in this
equilibrium, colleges’ payoffs EQcj depend on the number of students, the expected
value of student skills and the rank of colleges.
EQcj =
(
N − 1
N
)j−1
E [α] for j = 1, ..., M. (4)
Now we deduce students’ payoffs in this symmetric equilibrium. In this case, we have
to find the probability that each student i = 1, ..., N enrolls at college cj for j = 1, ..., M.
First of all, we know that the student i will reject any available offer but the best one.
This implies that a student i enrolls at the college c1 with probability 1N . It is easy to
show that , in general, a student i enrolls at the college cj with probability, 1N
(N−1
N
)j−1
.
Then the expected payoff of the student i = 1, ..., N is given by,
EU (N, M) =
1
N
M
∑
k=1
vk
(
N − 1
N
)k−1
(5)
Since students enroll at each college with positive probability, the student payoffs
are strictly positive for any M ≥ 1 and N ≥ M and satisfies v1 > EU (N, M) >
0. In addition, students may remain unmatched with positive probability equal to
1− 1N ∑Mk=1
(N−1
N
)k−1
=
(N−1
N
)M
, which is strictly positive, increasing in the number of
students and decreasing in the number of school places.
This simple model is useful to analyze the main consequences of the absence of
coordination in college admissions with incomplete information. First of all, note that
for any number of students N and school places M, all agents remain unmatched
with positive probability but the highest quality college. Note that the college c1 fills
its vacancy with probability one and gets a expected payoff equal to E [α] which
is the best prediction of student skills without additional information. Second, the
equilibrium assignment may be inefficient, since colleges only know the expected value
of student skills. Further, the probability of enrolling a students is decreasing in the
rank of colleges, since the probability
(N−1
N
)j−1
is strictly decreasing in j. Therefore,
the absence of coordination mainly damages low quality colleges.
1.4 the costly signaling mechanism .
In this section, we analyze a decentralized matching mechanism called Costly Signal-
ing Mechanism (CSM). Under this mechanism, each student s ∈ S chooses a costly
observable score Ps ≥ 0 to signal his skills. Hence, a student s ∈ S with type α who
chooses a score Ps has to pay the cost
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C (α, Ps) =
c (Ps)
φ (α)
(6)
We assume that the function c (·) is strictly increasing, continuous differentiable and
convex such that c (0) = 0. We also consider that the function φ (·) is strictly increasing,
continuous differentiable and bounded in the interval [0, w] such that φ (0) > 0.
The profile of student scores (Ps)s∈S is observable for all agents. Under the CSM,
colleges and students are match according to the following decentralized matching
procedure in two stages:
1. Signaling Stage: Each student s ∈ S with parameter α chooses a score Ps ≥ 0 at
the cost C (α, Ps).
2. Matching Stage: After observing the profile of scores (Ps)s∈S, students and
colleges match according to the following decentralized matching process:
a) Offers: Each college c ∈ C sends one message m (c) ∈ S ∪ {c}. If m (c) = s,
the college c is making an offer to the student s. If m (c) = c, the college c is
making no offer. Let O (s) = {c ∈ C : m (c) = s} ∪ {s} be the set of offers of
the student s (a student always receives an offer from himself) ;
b) Hiring: Each student s ∈ S chooses one of his available offers O (s).
We want to characterized a symmetric and strictly separating equilibrium where all
students use the same signaling strategy. Obviously, the model can admit many other
symmetric equilibria. For instance, pooling equilibria where no student invests in
signaling (in this situation we could sustain any of the symmetric equilibria analyzed
in the previous section) or semi-separating equilibria.
To sustain the strictly separating equilibrium, we consider beliefs according to which
the higher scored students are associated with higher academic skills. Formally, we
describe these beliefs by a continuous distribution of student abilities given the score
P > 0, i.e. a continuous cumulative distribution G (α | P). We assume that these beliefs
have associated a continuous density g (α | P) and satisfy G (α | P′) < G (α | P) for all
α ∈ (0, w) whenever P′ > P. Note that these conditions imply that E [α | P′] > E [α | P]
for all α ∈ (0, w) whenever P′ > P where ∫ αg (α | P) dα = E [α | P]. Thus higher
scored students are associated with higher expected skills.
The payoffs of colleges are given by the expected quality of enrollees that depends
on the outcome of the CSM (i.e. a matching between colleges and students) and
the profile of student scores. So given a matching µ, a college c ∈ C has expected
payoffs E
[
α | Pµ(c)
]
. On the other hand, a student s ∈ S with parameter α gets payoffs
vc − C (α, Ps) such that µ (s) = c and −C (α, Ps) otherwise.
In order to simplify, we consider that after observing the profile of student scores
(Ps)s∈S, colleges “update” their ordinal preferences in the following simple way. Each
college c ∈ C forms an auxiliary preference relation ∗c over the set students and the
prospect of remaining unmatched, S ∪ {c} such that: a) s ∗c c if and only if Ps > 0
and b) for any s, s′ ∈ S, s ∗c s′ if and only if Ps > Ps′ . Note that the profile of interim
preferences∗C= (∗c )c∈C is consistent with beliefs G (α | P).
At the matching stage of the CSM, the profile of student scores is given, so colleges
form the interim preference ∗C= (∗c )c∈C while the the signaling cost is sunk for
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students. This implies that student preferences at this stage are well defined and
coincide with the strict preferences S= (s)s∈S. Assume w.l.g. that colleges have
different qualities, i.e v1 > v2 > .. > vM > 0. On the other hand, assume also that
students’ scores satisfy Ps 6= Ps′ for all s, s′ ∈ S. This assumption about student scores
is not strong, since in equilibrium ties will happen with probability zero. Then for any
given profile of student scores (Ps)s∈S, at the matching stage of the CSM there is a well
defined college admissions problem with strict preferences denoted by (S, C, (S,∗C)).
Under these conditions, we can establish the following result.
Proposition 1 Consider the beliefs G (α | P) such that such that G (α | P′) < G (α | P) for
all α ∈ (0, w) whenever P′ > P. Then for any profile of student scores (Ps)s∈S such that
Ps 6= Ps′ for all s, s′ ∈ S and s 6= s′, there is a unique SPE outcome in the second stage of the
CSM. This equilibrium outcome is the unique stable matching of the college admissions problem,
(S, C, (S,∗C)). Further, this unique equilibrium assignment is assortative.
Only stable matchings between students and colleges are a reasonable outcomes
of the CSM (Alcalde and Romero-Medina, 1998). Further, under the interim college
preferences ∗C= (∗c )c∈C the outcome matching is assortative, i.e. the highest scored
student is matched with the best college; the second highest scored student is matched
with the second best college, and so on.
In the following section, we analyze the signaling equilibrium of the first stage of
the CSM. We focus on a symmetric pure strategy equilibrium where all students play
according to the same signaling strategy. We analyze a settings with M ≥ 1 school
places and N > M students. However, the model can be easily extended to analyze
any problem with the same number of students and school places.
1.4.1 The signaling equilibrium
We analyze the signaling equilibrium of the first stage of the CSM. To characterize this
equilibrium, we take as given the outcome of the matching stage of the mechanism. To
illustrate the problem, we focus on the simplest case with only one college with quality
v1 > 0 and N > 1 students.
In this setting, we analyze a separating symmetric Nash equilibrium of the signaling
game played by students. This equilibrium is characterized by a continuous differen-
tiable and strictly increasing signaling strategy with respect to student abilities. We
focus on the student 1’s problem, who chooses a score P1 to signal his skills while
the rest of students play according to a signaling strategy ρ : [0, w] → <+ which is
assumed to be strictly increasing and continuous differentiable in α such that ρ (0) = 0.
Since the outcome matching of the CSM is assortative, the students 1 with parameter
α gets the payoff v1 − C (α, P1) whenever P1 > ρ (αi) for all i 6= 1. This happens with
probability Pr [P1 > ρ (α2) , ..., P1 > ρ (αN)] = F
(
ρ−1 (P1)
)N−1 given that student skills
are identically and independently distributed according to F. Otherwise, the students
1 gets the payoff −C (α, P1) with probability 1− F
(
ρ−1 (P1)
)N−1. Hence, the expected
payoffs of the student 1 with parameter α, when the rest of students play according to
the signal function ρ (·) is:
pi (α, P1) = v1F
(
ρ−1 (P1)
)N−1 − C (α, P1) (7)
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The student 1 takes as given the signaling strategy of the rest of students and chooses
a score P1 to maximize his expected payoff pi (α, P1). The first order condition (FOC)
with respect to P1 leads the following condition,
v1 (N − 1) F
(
ρ−1 (P1)
)N−2
f
(
ρ−1 (P1)
) 1
ρ′ (ρ−1 (P1))
− c
′ (P1)
φ (α)
= 0 (8)
By reordering the previous expression, we obtain the following differential equation,
v1 (N − 1) φ (α) F
(
ρ−1 (P1)
)N−2
f
(
ρ−1 (P1)
)
= c′ (P1) ρ′
(
ρ−1 (P1)
)
(9)
In a symmetric equilibrium, P1 = ρ (α) then the previous differential equation
becomes in the following,
v1 (N − 1) φ (α) F (α)N−2 f (α) = c′ (ρ (α)) ρ′ (α) (10)
By solving this differential equation with the initial condition ρ (0) = 0, we find that
the equilibrium signaling strategy satisfies,
ρ (α) = c−1
(
v1 (N − 1)
∫ α
0
φ (x) F (x)N−2 f (x) dx
)
(11)
The equilibrium signaling strategy ρ (·) is strictly increasing and continuous differ-
entiable in α. Note that ρ (·) only satisfies the FOC of the student 1’s maximization
problem, which is necessary but not sufficient to characterize the signaling equilibrium.
Hence, we have to prove that the signaling strategy ρ (·) is in fact a symmetric equilib-
rium of this game. The equilibrium payoff of any student with parameter α is given
by,
pi (α, ρ (α)) = v1F (α)
N−1 − c (ρ (α))
φ (α)
(12)
It is not difficult to show that this payoff function satisfies ddα (pi (α, ρ (α))) > 0
and pi (0, ρ (0)) = 0. Hence, we show that any alternative score P′ 6= ρ (α) cannot
be a profitable deviation for any student with parameter α. Consider that a student
with parameter α is planning to choose another score 0 < P′ < ρ (α) while the rest
of students are playing according to the signaling strategy ρ (α). Since the signaling
strategy is strictly increasing in α and satisfies ρ (0) = 0, there exists a unique 0 < α′ < α
such that ρ (α′) = P′. This implies that a student who chooses an alternative strategy
P′ = ρ (α′) will get a payoff, pi (α, P′) = pi (α, ρ (α′)). Hence, a student with parameter
α losses the extra payoff pi (α, ρ (α))− pi (α, ρ (α′)) by not deviating to ρ (α′) = P′. Then
pi (α, ρ (α))− pi (α, ρ (α′)) = v1 (F (α)N−1 − F (α′)N−1)− c (ρ (α))− c (ρ (α′))
φ (α)
(13)
It is not difficult to show that the extra payoffs pi (α, ρ (α)) − pi (α, ρ (α′)) can be
reduced to the following expression,
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v1
(
F (α)N−1 − F (α′)N−1)− 1
φ (α)
v1 (N − 1)
∫ α
α′
φ (x) F (x)N−2 f (x) dx (14)
Since the function φ (x) is positive, strictly increasing in x and bounded in [0, w], it
is clear that the following inequality holds,
1
φ (α)
v1 (N − 1)
∫ α
α′
φ (x) F (x)N−2 f (x) dx < v1
∫ α
α′
(N − 1) F (x)N−2 f (x) dx (15)
In addition note that by definition
∫ α
α′ (N − 1) F (x)N−2 f (x) dx = F (α)N−1− F (α′)N−1.
This last condition implies that pi (α, ρ (α)) − pi (α, ρ (α′)) > 0 for all α′ < α which
proves that P′ = ρ (α′) is not a profitable deviation. By a similar argument, it is possible
to show that any alternative score P′′ > ρ (α) cannot be a profitable deviation. Then
the signaling strategy ρ (α) is a symmetric equilibria of the signaling game played by
students. In the following section, we show that all of these results hold in the general
case with M ≥ 2 colleges and N > M students. All proofs and calculations can be
found in the Appendix.
1.4.1.1 The general case: N > M ≥ 2.
Now consider a general case with N students and M colleges such that N > M ≥ 2.
Assume w.l.g. that all colleges have different qualities and satisfy v1 > v2 > ... > vM >
0. As before, we analyze the student 1’s maximization problem with parameter α ∈
(0, w) while all other students play according to some signaling strategy ρM : [0,∞)→
<+. As before, we assume that the signaling strategy ρM (·) is strictly increasing and
continuous differentiable in α such that ρM (0) = 0.
The student 1 chooses a score P1 ≥ 0 to signal his abilities. Consider the following
notation, we say that the student 1 has a “success” whenever P1 > ρM (αi) for some
other student i 6= 1 and a “failure” whenever P1 < ρM (αi) for some other student i 6= 1.
The probability of having one “success” is F
(
ρ−1M (P1)
)
whereas the probability of
having one “failure” is 1− F
(
ρ−1M (P1)
)
. Note that these probabilities are independent,
since students’ parameters are independently distributed.
For any given number of students N ≥ M, the student 1 with score P1 enrolls at
the colleges cj with quality vj, whenever he has N − j “successes” and j− 1 “failures”.
Note that this situation happens (N−1j−1 ) different times, then the probability of enrolling
at the college ck is,(
N − 1
k− 1
)
F
(
ρ−1M (P1)
)N−k [
1− F
(
ρ−1M (P1)
)]k−1
. (16)
The previous argument implies that the probability of enrolling at the college cj ∈ C
follows a binomial distribution. Hence, the expected payoff of the student 1 pi (α, P1)
satisfies,
pi (α, P1) =
M
∑
k=1
vk
(
N − 1
k− 1
)
F
(
ρ−1M (P1)
)N−k [
1− F
(
ρ−1M (P1)
)]k−1 − C (α, P1) (17)
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The student 1 takes as given the signaling strategy of the rest of students and chooses
a score P1 to maximize his expected payoff pi (α, P1). In Appendix A, we solve the
student 1’s maximization problem in a symmetric equilibrium where all students play
according to the same signaling strategy ρM (α). We show that the signal function that
satisfies the FOC of the student 1’s maximization problem characterizes this symmetric
separating equilibrium. Thus we establish the following result,
Proposition 2 The signaling strategy,
ρM (α) = c−1
(
M−1
∑
k=1
(vk − vk+1)
∫ α
0
φ (x) f(k,N−1) (x) dx + vM
∫ α
0
φ (x) f(M,N−1) (x) dx
)
is a symmetric equilibrium of college admissions problems with M ≥ 2 colleges and N > M
students.
Proof. See appendix A.
Given the equilibrium signaling strategy ρM (·), a student with parameter α will get
expected payoffs,
pi (α, ρM (α)) =
M
∑
k=1
vk
(
N − 1
k− 1
)
F (α)N−k [1− F (α)]k−1 − c (ρM (α))
φ (α)
(18)
Note that to characterize the signaling equilibrium, we assume some desirable prop-
erties of the equilibrium signaling strategy. We should show that these properties are
satisfied in equilibrium. A simple observation is enough to show that the equilibrium
signaling strategy and agents’ payoff are continuous differentiable functions in α. In the
following result, we establish some interesting properties of these signaling strategy
and equilibrium payoffs.
Proposition 3 The equilibrium signaling strategy ρM (α) and student payoffs pi (α, ρM (α))
satisfy the following properties:
1. ρM (α) is strictly increasing in α and bounded above.
2. pi (α, ρM (α)) is strictly increasing in α.
Proof. See appendix A.
Since the equilibrium signaling strategy is strictly increasing and probability of
having two students with the same skills is zero, no pair of students will choose the
same score. Then the equilibrium outcome of the CSM will be assortative with respect
to the true student skills. Hence, the highest skilled student will be matched with
the best college; the second highest skilled student will be matched with the second
best college; and so on. Further, students with higher abilities get greater payoffs. This
result comes from the single crossing property of the signaling cost, since higher skill
students have lower marginal signaling cost.
On the other hand, the assortative structure of the equilibrium assignment of the
CSM implies that colleges payoffs depend on the ranking of enrollees and the prior
distribution of student skills. Let µ∗ be the unique equilibrium outcome of the CSM,
then in equilibrium colleges get expected payoffs,
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EQ∗cj = E
[
α | Pµ∗(c)
]
= E
[
α(j,N)
]
=
∫ w
0
α f(j,N) (α) dα for j = 1, ..., M. (19)
Where α(j,N) is the j-th order statistic from a sample of size N such that α(1) = max
1≤i≤N
αi
, α(2) = second greatest αi, and so on. It is well known that the order statistic α(j,N) is
distributed according to the probability density function,
f(j,N) (α) =
N!
(j− 1)! (N − j)! f (α) F (α)
N−j [1− F (α)]j−1 for j = 1, ..., M. (20)
Under this conditions, it is not difficult to show that responding to students’ signals
is an equilibrium situation for colleges. First of all, it is not difficult to show that the best
strategy for any college cj is to respond to students’ signals providing all higher quality
colleges
{
c1, c2, ..., cj−1
}
do. The argument is very simple, college cj has to compare the
expected skills of enrollees between responding to students’ signals and any alternative
admission rule. Note that cj knows that all students are willing to accept its offer but
those already enrolled at colleges
{
c1, c2, ..., cj−1
}
, since by assumption those colleges
respond to signals and have greater qualities. This implies that any potential enrollee of
the college cj has skills α ≤ α(j). By responding to students’ signals, the college cj will
enroll the best student among the available ones. In contrast, with any other admission
rule it will enroll a lower skilled students.
Now consider the case of the best college, c1 knows that its offer will be accepted by
any student. Since by responding to students’ signals, c1 will enroll the best student
among all students, it optimally responds to students’ signals. Then a simple induction
argument shows that all colleges respond to students’ signals.
1.5 comparative statics .
In previous sections, we characterize a separating symmetric equilibrium of the signal-
ing game induced by the CSM. This equilibrium is characterized by an equilibrium
signaling strategy that depends on several parameters like the prior distribution of
skills; the number of students and school seats; and college qualities. Our explicit char-
acterization allows us to conduct interesting comparative statics exercises to analyze
the impact of a change in the underlying parameters of the model on the equilibrium
signaling strategy. In particular, we focus on three experiments:
1. A change in the number of students;
2. A change in the number of school places; and
3. A change in the quality of colleges.
The analysis of these experiments is crucial to understand real-world colleges admis-
sions as a signaling process whose outcome depends on the interaction of strategic
decision makers. Our model provides a good approach to analyze the effect of a change
of those underlying parameters.
One of the most important real-world signal in college admissions is the SAT test
in the US. Most students take the SAT during the last year of high school, and almost
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all colleges and universities use it to make admission decisions. Empirical studies
analyze the importance of the SAT and provide empirical evidence that support our
model of decentralized college admissions with incomplete information and costly
signaling. First of all, it is possible to argue that the SAT is a costly signal that depends
on on the amount of effort invested by students. Further, according to the structure of
the SAT is expected that higher skilled students get better scores. Secondly, it is well
known that there is a strong correlation between SAT scores and real student skills. For
instance, Frey and Detterman (2004) show that there is a high correlation between SAT
scores and several measures of student success like IQs. Finally, the matching between
colleges and students tend to be assortative with respect to the true student skills, since
the best colleges and universities tend to enroll students with high SAT scores (Webster,
2001a, 2001b).
It is clear that an incorrect understanding of the underlying signaling game in college
admissions may lead us to suggest wrong policy recommendations. For instance,
empirical evidence in the US shows that there is a decline in the mean SAT scores
as the participation rate increases. If we only consider the high correlation between
SAT scores and measures of student skills. We can suggest that the decline in SAT
scores comes from an increase in the proportion of low skilled students who have
taken the test, i.e. a change in the current distribution of student skills. According to
this argument, a policy recommendation would be to increase the expenditure in SAT
coaching and tutorials in high school in order to improve the abilities of test-takers.
However, the previous argument and policy recommendation ignore the underlying
signaling game in college admissions, since they do not consider that in the face of
new competitors, students may decrease strategically the investment in signaling with
no change in the underlying distribution of skills.
1.5.1 A change in the number of students.
We analyze the effect of a change in the number of students over the equilibrium
signaling strategy ρM (α) = ρM (α, N). Intuitively, an increase in the number of stu-
dents should decreases the probability of enrolling at college which leads students to
decrease their investment in signaling. This intuition seems correct, however we are not
considering that the effect of increasing the competition may not be symmetric across
students. The probability of beating potential competitors to enroll at college depends
on student abilities. A low skilled student knows that the probability of facing new
high skilled competitors is big while a high skilled student knows that the probability
of facing qualified competitors is small. We consider an exercise where we increase the
number of students while we maintain fixed all other parameters of the model. The
result of this exercise shows that this effect depends on academic abilities. Formally,
Proposition 4 For any college admissions problem with M ≥ 1 colleges and N > M students,
ρM (α, N + 1) < ρM (α, N) for all α ≤ αN (N) and N > M. Further, the threshold αN (N)
is strictly monotone increasing N.
Proof. See appendix A.
The previous result has two main implications. First of all, we find that as the number
of students increases the low qualified students decrease the investment in signaling
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while the high skilled students may increase it. A student with parameter α enrolls
at college ck with probability (
N−1
k−1 )F (α)
N−k [1− F (α)]k−1. Thus we can identify two
opposite effects. On the one hand, the probability F (α)N−k [1− F (α)]k−1 of having
N − k successes decreases as N increases. On the other hand, the number of successful
draws (N−1k−1 ) where the student beats N − k competitors increases as N increases.
Then these two opposite effects may lead the high (low) skilled students to increase
(decrease) the probability of enrolling at college and increase (decrease) the investment
in signaling.
Figure 1: Effect of increasing the number of students
The second interesting implication deals with the monotonicity of the threshold
αN (N). We find that this threshold is monotone increasing in N, i.e. αN (N + 1) >
αN (N) for any N > M. This implies that students do not increase the investment in
signaling when they face N + 1 competitors if they have already decreased it with
N. This property of the equilibrium and the fact that the the equilibrium signaling
strategy is bounded above allow us to infer the effect on the average investment in
signaling when the number of students increases. Let R (N) =
∫
ρM (α, N) f (α) dα be
the expected (average) investment in signaling, according to the previous argument
there should exist a sufficiently large demand for school places Nˆ such that R (N + 1) <
R (N) for all N ≥ Nˆ.
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Figure 2: Average investment in signaling with respect to N
In the US college admissions system, it has been extensively analyzed the impact of
increasing the number of test-takers on the mean SAT scores. According to data of the
College Board for several years, it has been observed a decline in the mean SAT scores
as the participation rate increases. The College Board explains this stylized fact in the
following way11:
“It is common for mean scores to decline slightly when the number of students taking an
exam increases because more students of varied academic backgrounds are represented in the
test-taking pool.”
This interpretation only considers the positive correlation between the SAT and
students abilities to infer that an increase in the number of applicants systematically
decreases the proportion of good test-takers. However, this interpretation does not
consider the underlying signaling game in college admissions. In contrast, our model
suggests that an increase in the number of applicants not only leads the low skilled
students to decrease the investment in signaling but also increases the proportion
people who reduce it. Then an increase in the number of competitors will eventually
reduce the average investment in signaling with no change on the prior distribution of
student abilities.
1.5.2 A change in the number of school places.
The following experiment deals with the effect of a change in the number of school
places on the equilibrium signaling strategy. We consider an experiment where the
number of school places can increase but remaining lower than the number of students.
Intuitively, an increase in the number of available school places should increase the
probability of enrolling at college and lead students to increase the investment in
signaling.
Our model shows that this intuitive argument may not be correct, at least not for all
students. As in the previous case, the effect of a change in the number of school places
is not symmetric across student. In order to simplify, we consider a very simple model
11 College board (2011), “43% of 2011 College-Bound Senior Met SAT College and Career Readness Bench-
mark” at http://press.collegeboard.org/releases/2011/43-percent-2011-college-bound-seniors-met-sat-
college-and-career-readiness-benchmark
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with N students and one college that offers M ≥ 1 school seats. In this setting, it is easy
to show that the equilibrium signaling strategy of the problem satisfies the following,
ρM (α, M) = c−1
(
v1
∫ α
0 φ (x) f(M,N−1) (x) dx
)
(21)
Then we establish the following result,
Proposition 5 For any college admissions problem with one college with M ≥ 2 school seats
and N > M + 1 students, ρM (α, M + 1) > ρM (α, M) for all α ≤ αM (M, N). Further, the
threshold αM (M, N) is monotone increasing in N and monotone decreasing in M.
Proof. See appendix A.
The previous result has several interesting implications. First of all, an increase in
the number of school places leads the low skilled students to increase the investment
in signaling while the high qualified students may decrease it. Intuitively, an increase
in the number of school places should be equivalent to a decrease in the number of
students with a fixed number of school seats.
Figure 3: Effect of increasing the number of school places
We also show that threshold αM (M, N) is monotone decreasing in M, i.e. αM (k + 1, N) <
αM (k, N) for k = 1, ..., M. This result allows us to establish some general conclusions
about the shape of the average investment in signaling as a function of the number
of school places. We prove that low and high skilled students change the investment
in signaling in opposite directions. Then when there are a few available school seats,
a new one is very valuable and leads students to increase the average investment in
signaling. However, when the number of school places increases, the proportion of
people that decrease the investment also increases, since a new school place is less
valuable. Thus, there should be a big enough number of school places, from which an
additional school seat decreases the average investment in signaling.
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Figure 4: Average investment in signaling with respect to M
1.5.3 A change in the quality of colleges
In this section, we analyze the effect of a change in college qualities on the equilibrium
signaling strategy. We focus on a change in qualities that preserve ordinal student
preferences. For instance, if the college ck changes its quality from vk to v′k, it should
be true that vk−1 > v′k > vk+1, whenever vk−1 > vk > vk+1. This assumption makes
comparable the equilibrium signaling strategies before and after the change in college
qualities, since the equilibrium assignment of the CSM is the same in both situations.
Intuitively, when a college increases its quality the average quality of schools also
increases, this increment in students’ valuations makes reasonable to increase the
investment in signaling. However, as in the previous cases, this result depends on
student abilities. Let sgn (x) be a function such that sgn (x) = 1 if x > 0, sgn (x) = −1
if x < 0 and sgn (x) = 0 if x = 0. Then we establish the following result.
Proposition 6 For any college admissions problem with M ≥ 2 colleges and N > M students,
sgn
(
ρM
(
α, v′k
)− ρM (α, vk)) = sgn (v′k − vk) for all α ≤ αvk (N, k) and k = 1, ..., M.
Further, the threshold αvk (N, k) is monotone increasing N for all k = 2, ..., M and monotone
decreasing in k.
Proof. See appendix A.
The previous result has interesting implications. First of all, only low skilled students
are willing to increase the investment in signaling while the high qualified students
may decrease it. Intuitively, the an increase in college qualities is more valuable for low
skilled students than for high skilled ones. This implies that only an increase in the
quality of the best colleges leads the highest skilled students to increase the investment
in signaling. On the other hand, we also show that the threshold αvk (N, k) is monotone
decreasing in k, i.e. αvk (N, k + 1) < αvk (N, k) for all k = 1, ..., M − 1. As expected,
students are more willing to increase their investment for high quality colleges. Further,
in appendix A we show that αv1 (N, 1) = w for any N, which implies that only an
increase in the quality of the college c1 has no asymmetry across students, i.e. all
students are willing to increase the investment in signaling.
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Figure 5: A change in the quality of the best college
1.6 gains of the csm
In previous sections, we analyze a separating symmetric equilibria of the CSM that
maximizes the number of potential matches and lead the best students to enroll at the
best colleges. In contrast with no signaling, the low quality colleges are able to enroll
better students with positive probability. Then some colleges may prefer to run an
admissions system with no signaling to enroll better students with positive probability.
A similar argument applies for low skilled students, whom pay the signaling cost and
lose the chance of enrolling at high quality colleges.
According to the previous argument, some agents may get losses under the CSM in
the sense that they can get better assignments and payoff with no signaling. Further, it
seems that low quality colleges and low skilled students are the most damaged agents
under the CSM. We define the gains of implementing the CSM in a natural way, as the
difference in equilibrium payoffs between the separating signaling equilibria of the
CSM and the symmetric equilibria of college admissions problem with no signaling.
According to this definition, students’ gains are defined as follows,
L (α) = pi (α, ρM (α))− EU (N, M) (22)
Since the student’s payoff in the game with no signaling EU (N, M) is type in-
dependent, students’ gains are strictly increasing in α. However, there always exits
a proportion of people that gets losses under the CSM, since pi (0, ρM (0)) = 0 and
EU (N, M) > 0. Note that eventually all students may get losses depending on the prior
distribution of skills. However, only the highest skilled students have the possibility of
getting positive gains.
The previous definition implies that college cj’s gains are defined as follows,
∆EQ (j, N) = EQ∗cj − EQcj for j = 1, ..., M. (23)
Where EQ∗cj = E
[
α(j)
]
is cj’s payoff in the separating equilibria of the CSM and
EQcj =
(N−1
N
)j−1 E [α] is cj’s payoff in the game with no signaling. The analysis of these
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gains is not a trivial issue. For instance, it is clear that with no signaling an increase
in the number of applicants must increase the probability of enrolling a student with
average abilities. Under the CSM, an increase in the number of applicants should lead
colleges to enroll better and better students. Since colleges gains are the difference
between these payoffs, it is not clear the final effect of increasing the number of students
on colleges’ gains. Similar arguments can be applied in the case of qualities, it is not
clear which colleges get the highest gains or if colleges gains are monotone in college
rankings.
On the other hand, to analyze colleges’ gains we require the analysis of order statistics.
This is a difficult problem, since most distributions have no closed form solutions for
moments of order statistics. To analyze this problem, we consider particular prior
distributions where it is possible to find closed form formulas for these moments. We
focus on the exponential model12, in this case it is possible to show that E
[
α(j)
]
=
N+1−j
∑
k=1
θ
N+1−k for j = 1, ..., M where E [α] = θ (Huang, 1974). Then, colleges’ gains
∆EQ (j, N) satisfy the following equation,
∆EQ (j, N) = θ
N+1−j
∑
k=1
1
N + 1− k − θ
(
N − 1
N
)j−1
(24)
Then, we establish the following result.
Proposition 7 Consider any M by N college admissions problem such that N > M ≥ 1.
Assume that students’ skills are exponentially distributed with parameter θ > 0. Then the
following holds:
1. ∆EQ (j, N) is strictly monotone increasing in N, i.e. ∆EQ (j, N + 1) > ∆EQ (j, N) for
all N > M and j = 1, ..., M;
2. ∆EQ (j, N) is strictly monotone decreasing in j, i.e. ∆EQ (j + 1, N) < ∆EQ (j, N) for
all N > M and j = 1, ..., M− 1; and
3. For any M ≥ 1 there always exists an N∗ > M such that ∆EQ (j, N) ≥ 0 for all
j = 1, ..., M and all N ≥ N∗.
Proof. See appendix A.
The previous result has interesting implications. First of all, an increasing demand
for school places improve the gains of enrolling students based on costly signals.
Intuitively, an increasing pool of students leads colleges to reduce the risk of remaining
unmatched while a costly signal becomes more and more effective to pick the best
available students. Another interesting implication regards with the comparison of
gains among colleges. As in the case of students, colleges’ gains can be ranked according
to college qualities. This result implies that the big winners of the CSM are the high
quality colleges, which not only enroll the best students but also get the greatest gains.
The third interesting implication regard with the relationship between the size of the
12 Skills are exponentially distributed with parameter θ > 0, if α is distributed according the density
function, f (α; θ) = 1θ e
− αθ . In this case, the cumulative distribution function is F (α; θ) = 1− e− αθ . In
addition, E [α] = θ.
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demand for school places and colleges’ gains. We find that a big enough demand for
school places leads all colleges to get positive gains. This result contrasts with the case
of students, where there is a proportion of students that always get losses.
Figure 6: Colleges’ gains with exponential distributed skills
It is easy to show that the previous results cannot be trivially extended to any prior
distribution of student skills. As we show in the following figure, we cannot guarantee
neither the monotonicity of colleges’ gains with respect to the number of students
nor the monotonicity with respect to colleges’ qualities. In this case, we consider Beta
distributed skills with parameters a = 10 and b = 2. Note that this distribution is
skewed to the right, this fact may explain why the previous results about colleges’
gains do not hold any more, since the probability of enrolling a good student with no
signaling is significantly big.
Figure 7: Colleges’ gains with Beta (10,2) distributed skills
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1.7 conclusion
We analyze some consequences of coordination problems in decentralized college
admissions with incomplete information. We consider a matching problem where
colleges with observable qualities want to enroll student whose abilities are private
information. We analyze a simple decentralized matching mechanism called Costly
Signaling Mechanism (CSM). Under the CSM, students choose a costly observable
score to signal their skills. We characterize a separating symmetric equilibrium of the
game induced by the CSM. In this equilibrium the CSM maximizes the number of
potential matches of the problem and induces agents to matched efficiently, in the
sense that the best students will enroll at the best colleges. Hence, for the case in which
the number of students equals the number of school seats, all agents will get matched
while when there are more students than school places only the highest skilled students
will get matched.
We conduct three exercises of comparative statics that allow us to analyze the impact
of a change in the underlying parameters of the model on the equilibrium signaling
strategy. Our main result shows that this effect is not symmetric across students, since
they depend on student abilities. The first comparative statics exercise regards with
the effect of a change in the number of students. In this case, we show that an increase
in the number of students leads low skilled students to decrease the investment in
signaling while the high skilled students may increase it. We also analyze the effect of
a change in the number of school places and a change in college qualities with similar
implications.
Finally, we analyze the gains of the CSM which are defined in a natural way as
the difference in equilibrium payoffs between the separating signaling equilibria of
the CSM and the symmetric equilibria of the college admissions problem with no
signaling. Under this definition, students’ gains are strictly increasing with respect to
the student skills, but eventually, all students may get losses depending on the prior
distribution of skills. Since colleges’ gains require the analysis of order statistics, we
consider the particular case of exponential distributed skills which allows us to find
closed form formulas of colleges’ gains. The exponential model has very interesting
implications. First of all, colleges’ gains are monotone increasing in college qualities.
Second, colleges’ gains are monotone increasing in the number of students, i.e. all
colleges benefit from an increasing demand for school places. Finally, we show that a
sufficiently large demand for school places leads all colleges to get positive gains.

2
M A N Y- T O - O N E M AT C H I N G : E X T E R N A L I T I E S A N D S TA B I L I T Y
2.1 introduction
In standard two-sided matching problems such as job markets, college admissions
and marriage problems, agents on one side of the market have preferences over the
set of agents on the opposite side. This specification of agents’ preferences entails the
absence of externalities, since agents only care about whom they are matched with.
The absence of externalities simplifies the matching problem and lead us to establish
relevant results regarding the existence and properties of several solution concepts in
matching markets such as the set of stable matchings and the core.
In many applications agents not only care about whom they are matched with
but also the partners of the others, so the presence of externalities may be crucial to
understand real-world matching problems. We can find several real-world examples of
matching markets that entail the presence of externalities. For instance, several com-
petitive economic situations like tournaments and contests; markets with downstream
competition; industrial research and development, etc.
The analysis of matching markets with externalities is challenging for at least two
reasons. First of all, agents should consider the whole matching between firms and
workers in order to define their preferences. Thus, in the presence of externalities
agents’ preferences must be defined over the set of all feasible matchings instead of
the agents on the opposite side of the markets. This issue has crucial implications
to analyze the matching problem, since some crucial restrictions over the domain of
preferences may not be well defined in the presence of externalities.
The second issue is the solution concept. In standard matching problems, agents
who plan to block a matching must compare their current and posterior partners
in order to evaluate whether deviating is profitable or not. Under this notion of
stability, deviating agents do not care about the reaction of non-deviating agents.
In contrast, once externalities are considered a deviation may be profitable or not
depending on the expected reaction of the rest of agents. This implies that agents must
anticipate the reactions of non-deviating agents whenever they plan to block a current
matching. According to this argument, it is clear that different assumptions about
agents’ predictions may lead to different notions of stability.
In previous literature, matching markets with externalities have been analyzed
under two main approaches. In the first case, we try to establish some assumptions
regarding agents’ reactions that assure the existence of stable matchings without any
restriction over the domain of agents’ preferences. Under the second approach, we try
to establish some restrictions over agents’ preferences that guarantee the existence of
stable matching under specific assumptions about agents’ reactions. In general, both
approaches are not equivalent.
Sasaki and Toda (1996) were the first to analyze the marriage problem with exter-
nalities. They propose a notion of stability that is similar to the idea of a conjectural
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equilibrium.1 Under this solution concept, agents predict the set of matchings that they
consider admissible under a given conjecture about the reactive behavior of agents.
These predictions are called “estimation functions”. Thus for a given set of estimation
functions ’, a matching is ’-stable whenever it is admissible for every agent and not
blocked by any man-woman pair or individual agent. Sasaki and Toda (1996) show
that ’-stable matching may not exists under particular sets of estimation functions.
However, they claim that a ’-stable matching exists if and only if all feasible matchings
are considered admissible by every agent. In this case, we say that the set of estimation
functions satisfy a condition called full admissibility. Hafalir (2008) extends this model by
providing a set of endogenous estimations that depends on agents’ preferences. Hafalir’s
estimations not only guarantees the existence of ’-stable matchings but also shows that
the assumption of full admissibility is not necessary to assure the existence of ’-stable
matchings.
Mumcu and Saglam (2010) also analyze the one-to-one matching problem with
externalities. In this case, they propose a notion of stability that satisfies the following
two conditions: a) deviating pairs join together while their previous mates, if any,
divorce and b) the rest of agents remain matched as before the deviation. Mumcu and
Saglam (2010) show that under this notion of stability a stable matchings may not exist.
However, they propose restrictions on agents’ preferences that assure the existence
stable assignments. Bando (2010) provides similar results in many-to-one problems
with externalities only on the firms’ side.
This chapter deals with the analysis of many-to-one matching markets with external-
ities. In particular, we analyze the existence of stable matchings in the sense of Sasaki
and Toda (1996). As in previous literature, we find that a ϕ-stable matching may not
exist. Further, we show that no set of estimation functions (endogenous or exogenous)
assures the existence of ϕ-stable matchings in many-to-one problems. This impossibility
result contrasts with the case of marriage problems, where there is at least one set of
estimation functions that guarantees the existence of ϕ-stable matchings.2 According
to these results, we can analyze our problem in two different ways to guarantee the
existence of ϕ-stable matchings. On the one hand, we can fix a set of estimations functions
to find reasonable restrictions on the domain of preferences. On the other hand, we
can fix a restriction on the domain of preferences to find a set of estimations functions.
According to the previous argument, we consider a benchmark model where the set
of estimations functions satisfies the condition of full admissibility. Under this restriction
on agents’ estimations, we find that a ϕ-stable matching exists whenever firms’ prefer-
ences satisfy a restriction called bottom q-substitutability. This restriction generalizes the
condition of q-substitutability (Cantala, 2004) to matching problems with externalities.
We also analyze whether the condition of full admissibility is necessary under the
domain of bottom q-substitutable preferences. We consider a model with pessimistic
agents to rationalize the set of estimation functions.3 In this setting, we provide a set
of endogenous pessimistic estimation functions that depends on agents’ preferences. We
show that this estimations functions do not satisfy the condition of full admissibility.
1 A conjectural equilibrium is a situation where no agent has incentives to deviate given a conjecture about
the reactive behavior of agents (Rubinstein and Wolinsky, 1994; Azrieli, 2009).
2 See, Sasaki and Toda (1996) and Hafalir (2009).
3 Sasaki and Toda (1996) show that a ϕ-stable matching may not exist when only one of the agents is not
pessimistic enough.
2.2 the model 31
Further, we show that under the set of pessimistic estimations, a ϕ-stable matching exists
providing preferences are bottom q-substitutable.
The last part of the chapter deals with the analysis of the core of matching markets
with externalities. Sasaki and Toda (1996) introduce a notion of the core in marriage
problems with externalities. They show that the core and the set of pair-wise ϕ-stable
matchings do not coincide. Further, the core may be empty for some instances of
the problem. We propose an alternative notion of the core that depends on the set
of estimation functions called the ϕ-core. Our main result shows that for any set of
estimation functions the set of ϕ-stable matchings and the ϕ-core always coincide. This
result contrasts with previous findings and implies that all properties of the set of
stable ϕ-matchings naturally extend to the ϕ-core.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2.2, we introduce the
model and some basic examples; in Section 2.3, we introduce the condition of bottom
q-substitutability to characterize the existence of ϕ-stable matchings; in Section 2.4, we
introduce the set of pessimistic estimations functions; in Section 2.5, we introduce the
ϕ-core; in Section 2.6, we present some conclusions. Finally, all proofs are in appendix
B.
2.2 the model
Let F denote the set of firms and let W denote the set of workers. F and W are disjoint
and finite sets with m ≥ 1 and n ≥ 1 members, respectively. Each worker w ∈ W
wants to work for at most one firm while each firm f ∈ F has a quota q f ≤ n that
denotes the maximum number of workers that the firm is able to hire. We denote by
H f =
{
S ∈ 2W : |S| ≤ q f
}
the set of all subsets of workers (including the empty set of
workers) that the firm f is able to hire. A matching is a rule that specifies a group of
workers for each firm and a firm for each worker allowing for the possibility that some
agents remain unmatched. Formally,
Definition 2 A matching is a mapping µ : F ∪W → 2F∪W such that:
1. |µ (w)| = 1 for all w ∈W and either µ (w) ∩ F 6= ∅ or µ (w) = {w};
2. µ ( f ) ∈ H f for all f ∈ F. If µ ( f ) = ∅ then the firm f does not hire any worker; and
3. µ (w) = { f } if and only if w ∈ µ ( f ).
LetM denote the set of all feasible matchings given F, W and q. In standard matching
problems, agents have ordinal preferences over the set of agents on the opposite side
of the market, i.e. workers have preferences over the set of firms and the prospect of
remaining unmatched while firms have preferences over the set of groups of workers
including the empty set. This specification of preferences lead agents to only care about
whom they are matched with and not the partners of the others, i.e. it is not considered
the presence of potential externalities. In this paper, we consider a more general setting
where agents’ valuations over potential partners may depend on the whole matching
between firms and workers. According to this model, agents not only care about whom
they are matched with but also the partners of the others. This specification of agents’
preferences introduces explicitly the presence of externalities in matching problems.
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In the presence of externalities, agents preferences would be defined by a preference
relation over the set of all feasible assignments. Formally, each agent a ∈ F ∪W has a
complete, strict and transitive preference relation over the set of all feasible matchings
M denoted by P∗a . Thus for any given two pair of feasible matchings µ, µ′ ∈ M, the
preference relation µP∗a µ′ means that the agent a ∈ F ∪W prefers the assignment µ (a)
under the matching µ to the assignment µ′ (a) under the matching µ′. Note that this
preferences are even more general than a simply comparison between agents (sets of
agents) on the opposite side of the market, since an agent a ∈ F∪W may have the same
assignment under two different matchings µ and µ′ (i.e. µ (a) = µ′ (a) ) without being
indifferent between them. According to this preferences, an agent would be indifferent
between two matchings only if these matchings are identical. Formally, two matchings
µ, µ′ ∈ M are identical µ = µ′ if and only if µ (a) = µ′ (a) for all a ∈ F ∪W. For each
agent a ∈ F ∪W, let R∗a denote the weak preference relation induced by P∗a , so for any
two feasible matchings µ, µ′ ∈ M, the preference relation µR∗aµ′ means either µP∗a µ′ or
µ = µ′. Let P∗=
(
P∗f1 , ..., P
∗
fm ; P
∗
w1 , ..., P
∗
wn
)
denote the profile of agents’ preferences, thus
a matching problem with externalities is a four-tuple (F, W, P∗, q).
We consider a solution concept for matching markets with externalities based on the
concept of estimation functions (Sasaki and Toda, 1996; Hafalir, 2008). According to
this solution concept, in the presence of externalities agents form expectations about
the set of matching that they consider admissible. Agents consider such expectations in
order to evaluate whether deviating from a current matching is profitable or not. These
expectations are called estimation functions (or simply estimations).
Before introducing a formal definition of the set of estimation functions, we require
some additional notation. Let A ( f , S) =
{
µ ∈ M : µ ( f ) ∈ H f
}
denote the set of all
feasible matchings where the firm f and the feasible set of workers S are matched. In
a similar way, let A (w, a) denote the set of all matchings where the worker w ∈ W
and the agent a ∈ F ∪ {w} are matched. For each firm f ∈ F and any set of feasible
workers S ∈ H f , a estimation function ϕ f specifies a non-empty subset of matchings
where f and S are matched. Formally, for each f ∈ F, ϕ f maps a non-empty subset of
matchings ϕ f (S) ⊂ A ( f , S) for every S ∈ H f . In a similar way, for each worker w ∈W
the estimation function ϕw maps a non-empty subset of matchings ϕw (a) ⊂ A (w, a) for
every a ∈ F∪w. Let ’ = {(ϕ f (·) , ϕw (·)) : f ∈ F and w ∈W} denote a set of estimation
functions of a matching problem with externalities (F, W, P∗, q). Note that the set of
estimation functions may be either exogenous given or an endogenous mapping which
depend on agents preferences and other additional conditions.
As we argue before, our notion of stability in the presence of externalities depends
on the concept of estimation functions. On the one hand, a first requirement for a
stable matching is to be admissible for all agents. Intuitively, a stable matching has to
be consistent with the fact that agents only care about matchings that they consider
admissible. Hence, we introduce the following definition,
Definition 3 Given a set of estimation functions ’, a matching µ is ϕ-admissible whenever
µ ∈ ϕa (µ (a)) for all a ∈ F ∪W.
A second requirement for a stable matching is to be free of the presence of coalitions
of agents that would like to deviate from this matching. In order to be consistent
with the presence of externalities, agents must consider their estimation fictions when
2.2 the model 33
they plan to deviate from a current matching. Intuitively, an agent is willing to block
a matching only if he is better off under all admissible matchings after deviating.
According to this intuitive argument, we consider the following notion of deviating
coalitions in the presence of externalities.
Definition 4 An individual worker w ∈ W, such that µ (w) 6= w, blocks the matching µ if
µ′P∗wµ for all µ′ ∈ ϕw (w).
Definition 5 A coalition firm-set of workers { f , S} such that S ∈ H f and µ ( f ) 6= S, blocks
the matching µ if:
1. µ′P∗f µ for all µ
′ ∈ ϕ f (S) and
2. µ′′P∗wµ for all µ′′ ∈ ϕw ( f ) and all w ∈ S.
Then given a set of estimations functions ’, a matching µ is ϕ-stable if it is ϕ-admissible
and not blocked by any individual worker or coalition. Let Eϕ (F, W, P∗, q) denote the
set of ϕ-stable matchings of the problem.
Note that this notion of stability with externalities induces a natural notion of stability
in matching problem without externalities where the concept of admissibility is not
necessary.
2.2.1 Preliminary examples
In this section, we analyze some simple examples to introduce two main issues. First
of all, we show that a ϕ-stable matching may not exist in matching problems with
externalities. Secondly, we also provide a crucial result that establishes that no set of
estimation functions guarantees the existence of ϕ-stable matchings.
Along these examples, we consider a particular set of estimation functions where every
matching is considered admissible for all agents, this situation is called full admissibility.
Formally, we say that a set estimation functions ’ satisfies full admissibility if for each firm
f ∈ F, it is satisfied ϕ f (S) = A ( f , S) for all S ∈ H f and for each worker w ∈ W, it
is satisfied ϕw (a) = A (w, a) for all a ∈ F ∪ {w}. Let E (F, W, P∗, q) denote the set of
ϕ-stable matchings with a set of estimation functions that satisfy full admissibility.
According to our notion of stability, in matching problems with externalities every
agent who plans to deviate from a current matching should consider the set of all
admissible matchings after deviating. In contrast, when there are no externalities,
agents only consider their current and posterior partners to evaluate whether deviating
is profitable or not. Thus, it seems to be more difficult to block a matching in the
presence of externalities, since every deviating agent should be better off under all
admissible matchings after deviating. This intuitive argument implies that it should be
relatively easy to sustain the existence of stable matching in problems with externalities.
However, it is easy to find examples of matching problems with externalities with no
ϕ-stable matchings.
Example 1 Consider a matching problem with three workers W = {w1, w2, w3} and two
firms F = { f1, f2} with quotas q f1 = 2 and q f2 = 1. In order to simplify, we describe
a matching by a list of workers’ partners in the order w1, w2, ..., wn. For instance, the the
matching µ1 = f1, f1, f2 means that µ1 (w1) = f1, µ1 (w2) = f2 and µ1 (w3) = f2. The set of
all feasible matchings of this problem is given in the following table,
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Table 1: Set of feasible matchings
µ1 = f1, f1, f2 µ2 = f1, w2, f2 µ3 = w1, f1, f2 µ4 = w1, w2, f2
µ5 = f1, f1, w3 µ6 = f1, w2, w3 µ7 = w1, f1, w3 µ8 = f1, f2, f1
µ9 = w1, f2, f1 µ10 = f1, f2, w3 µ11 = w1, f2, w3 µ12 = f1, w2, f1
µ13 = w1, w2, f1 µ14 = f2, f1, f1 µ15 = f2, f1, w3 µ16 = f2, w2, f1
µ17 = f2, w2, w3 µ18 = w1, f1, f1 µ19 = w1, w2, w3
Consider the following agents’ preferences over the set of feasible matchings.
P∗f1 = µ1, µ5, µ4, µ11, µ17, µ19, µ10, µ2, µ6, µ7, µ3, µ15, µ13, µ16, µ9, µ14, µ18, µ8, µ12.
P∗f2 = µ2, µ3, µ4, µ1, µ14, µ15, µ16, µ17, µ8, µ9, µ10, µ11, µ5, µ6, µ7, µ12, µ13, µ18, µ19.
P∗w1 = µ1, µ2, µ5, µ6, µ8, µ10, µ12, µ17, µ16, µ15, µ14, µ3, µ4, µ7, µ9, µ11, µ13, µ18, µ19.
P∗w2 = µ8, µ9, µ10, µ11, µ18, µ15, µ14, µ7, µ5, µ3, µ1, µ19, µ17, µ16, µ13, µ12, µ6, µ4, µ2.
P∗w3 = µ8, µ9, µ12, µ13, µ14, µ16, µ18, µ5, µ6, µ7, µ10, µ11, µ15, µ19, µ17, µ1, µ2, µ3, µ4.
Consider a set of estimation functions that satisfies full admissibility. Hence, every
matching is ϕ-admissible and, as consequence, a candidate to be ϕ-stable. In order to
show that a matching µ is not ϕ-stable, we need to find either a worker or a coalition
with incentives to block the matching µ. Consider for instance the case of the matching
µ8 = f1, f2, f1 and the coalition composed by the firm f1 and the empty set of workers.
It is easy to show that the set of matchings where the firm f1 and the empty set of
workers are matched is A ( f1, /O) = {µ4, µ11, µ17, µ19}. Note that by assumption, every
matching in the set A ( f1, /O) is admissible for the firm f1. Further, according to f1’s
preferences it is easy to observe that µ′P∗f1µ8 for all µ
′ ∈ A ( f1, /O). Hence, the matching
µ8 cannot be ϕ-stable, since it is blocked by the coalition { f1, /O}. By a similar argument,
it is easy to show that according to agents’ preferences every feasible matching of this
problem can be blocked by at least one coalition or worker.
Table 2: Blocking coalitions
Matching Blocked by
µ1, µ2, µ3, µ4 {w3}
µ5, µ6, µ7, µ12 { f2, {w2}}
µ8, µ9, µ10, µ14, µ15 { f1, Ø}
µ11, µ18 { f2, {w1}}
µ13, µ16, µ17, µ19 { f1, {w1, w2}}
This simple example shows that a ϕ-stable matching may not exist even when the
set of estimation functions satisfy full admissibility. This is an interesting implication,
since in contrast with the marriage problem with externalities the condition of full
admissibility is not sufficient to assure the existence of ϕ-stable assignments in many-to-
one matching problems (Sasaki and Toda, 1996).
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It is interesting to note that our notion of stability also allows to analyze an some
particular cases of the matching problem where we only consider the presence of
externalities over one side of the market. For instance, we can consider a simple setting
with externalities on the firms’ side, i.e. firms have preferences defined over the set
of all feasible matchings while workers have preferences over the set of firms and the
prospect of remaining unmatched.
Example 2 Consider a matching problem with two firms F = { f1, f2} and three workers
W = {w1, w2, w3} with quotas q fi = 2 for i = 1, 2. The set of all feasible matchings of this
problem is given in the following table,
Table 3: Set of feasible matchings
µ1 = f1, f1, f2 µ2 = f1, f2, f2 µ3 = f1, f2, f1 µ4 = f1, f1, w3
µ5 = f1, w2, w3 µ6 = f1, w2, f1 µ7 = f1, w2, f2 µ8 = f1, f2, w3
µ9 = f2, f2, f1 µ10 = f2, f1, f1 µ11 = f2, f1, f2 µ12 = f2, f2, w3
µ13 = f2, w2, w3 µ14 = f2, w2, f2 µ15 = f2, w2, f1 µ16 = f2, f1, w3
µ17 = w1, w2, f2 µ18 = w1, f1, w3 µ19 = w1, f2, w3 µ20 = w1, f1, f1
µ21 = w1, f2, f2 µ22 = w1, f1, f2 µ23 = w1, f2, f1 µ24 = w1, w2, f1
µ25 = w1, w2, w3
Consider the following firms’ preferences over the set of all feasible matching:
P∗f1 = µ6, µ3, µ4, µ1, µ20, µ10, µ7, µ5, µ8, µ2, µ22, µ16, µ18, µ11, µ25, µ19, µ17, µ14, µ13, µ12,
µ21, µ23, µ24, µ15, µ9.
P∗f2 = µ14, µ11, µ21, µ2, µ12, µ9, µ7, µ22, µ17, µ1, µ13, µ16, µ15, µ10, µ19, µ8, µ23, µ3, µ25, µ5,
µ20, µ6, µ18, µ24, µ4.
And the following workers’ preferences over the set of firms and the prospect of
remaining unmatched:
Pw1 = f2, f1, w1.
Pw2 = f2, f1, w2.
Pw3 = f1, f2, w3.
As in the previous example, we consider that firms have a set of estimation functions
that satisfies full admissibility and block a matching according to our notion of stability in
the presence of externalities, i.e. they compare the current matching with all admissible
matchings after deviating. On the other hand, workers only make a comparison between
their current and prospect partners when they plan to deviate from a current matching.
In order to illustrate the problem, consider the case of the matching µ3 = f1, f2, f1.
It is easy to show that µ3 can be blocked by the coalition { f2, {w1}}. First of all, note
that for the firm f2 the set of all admissible matchings after deviating is given by
A ( f2, {w1}) = {µ10, µ13, µ15, µ16}. In addition, according to f2’s preferences it is easy to
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observe that µ′P∗f2µ3 for all µ
′ ∈ A ( f2, {w1}). On the other hand, note that according to
w1’s preferences f2Pw1µ3 (w1). Hence, the matching µ3 cannot be ϕ-stable. By a similar
argument, it is easy to show that every feasible matching can be blocked by either a
coalition or individual worker. In fact, it is not difficult to show that every feasible
matching of the problem can be blocked by either a worker or a coalition as we show
in the following table.
Table 4: Blocking coalitions
Matching Blocked by
µ1 = f1, f1, f2 { f2, {w1, w3}}
µ10 = f2, f1, f1 { f2, {w1, w2}}
µ11 = f2, f1, f2 { f1, {w2, w3}}
µ2 = f1, f2, f2 { f2, {w1, w3}}
µ9 = f2, f2, f1 { f1, φ}
In addition, any matching that leaves w1 unmatched is blocked by either { f1, {w1}}
or { f2, {w1}}. Any matching that leaves w2 unmatched is blocked by either { f1, {w2}},
{ f2, {w2}} or { f2, {w2, w3}} . Finally, any matching that leaves w3 unmatched is blocked
by { f2, {w1, w3}}. Then as in the previous example, the set of ϕ-stable matchings of
this problem is empty, i.e. E (F, W, P∗, q) = /O.
Sasaki and Toda (1996) analyze the marriage problem with externalities and introduce
this notion of stability based on the concept of estimation functions. As in our more
general setting, they also show that a ϕ-stable matching may not exists given particular
sets of estimation functions. However, in addition they also provide a set of estimations
that guarantees such existence. Further, they claim that a ϕ-stable matching exists if and
only if the set of estimation functions satisfies full admissibility. Hafalir (2008) shows that
this conjecture is incorrect, since he characterizes a set of endogenous estimations that
does not satisfies full admissibility and guarantees the existence of ϕ-stable matchings.
Our examples follow this line and show that a ϕ-stable matching may not exists
under particular sets of estimation functions. However, our results are even more
general, since we also show that in this setting the condition of full admissibility is
not sufficient to assure the existence of ϕ-stable matchings. The following result gives
even more insights about the scope of these results, since they allow us to establish
more general conclusions about the existence of ϕ-stable assignments in many-to-one
matching problems.
Lemma 1 Let (F, W, P∗, q) be any instance of the matching problem with externalities. If there
are no ϕ-stable matchings under full admissibility, then there are no ϕ-stable matchings for any
possible set of estimation functions.
Note that Examples 1 and 2 and Lemma 1 imply the following general impossibility
result.
Theorem 1 In many-to-one matching problems with externalities, no set of estimation func-
tions ’ guarantees the existence of ϕ-stable matchings.
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The previous result has crucial implications for the analysis of matching problems
with externalities. On the one hand, our result shows that for any the set of estimation
functions there exist at least one matching problem with no ϕ-stable matchings. On the
one hand, this result suggests that a restriction on the domain of agents’ preferences
seems necessary to guarantee the existence of ϕ-stable assignments.
2.3 the existence of ϕ-stable matchings under full admissibility
In the previous section, we argue that the impossibility of finding a set of estimation
functions that guarantees the existence of ϕ-stable matchings suggests that a restriction
on the domain of preferences may be necessary to guarantee the existence of such
allocations. The analysis of standard matching problems arises to similar conclusions,
since the existence of stable matchings in many-to-one problems can be guaranteed
only under restricted domains of preferences (Roth and Sotomayor,1992).
The substitutability of preferences (Kelso and Crawford, 1982) and several general-
izations of this condition4 have been the main way to guarantee the existence of stable
matchings in many-to-one problems. However, these restrictions on agents’ preferences
may not be well defined in matching problems with externalities. First of all, note that
firms may not be able to define their optimal choices. In the presence of externalities,
agents’ preferences depend on the complete matching between firms and workers,
hence a firm may not be able to choose the best group of workers among a set of
candidates without considering the matching of the rest of agents. This argument
implies that a generalization of the condition of substitutability requires a careful
treatment in the presence of externalities.
In the rest of this section, we focus on matching problems with estimation functions
that satisfy full admissibility. Under these conditions, we introduce a restriction on
agents’ preferences called bottom q-substitutability that generalizes the condition of
q-substitutability (Cantala, 2004) to environments with externalities and guarantees the
existence of ϕ-stable matchings. We also consider a very interesting approach to analyze
the problem that consists in constructing a reduced problem without externalities that
allows us to apply standard results to establish the existence of ϕ-stable matchings.5
2.3.1 The reduced problem
In this section, we show how to construct a consistent reduced problem for any matching
problem with externalities. For this purpose, we require some additional notation.
Given a set of estimation functions ’, for each firm f ∈ F (worker w ∈W) the matching
µSf (µ
a
w) satisfies the following conditions: a) µSf ∈ ϕ f (S) (µaw ∈ ϕw (a)) and b) µ′R∗fµSf
for all µ′ ∈ ϕ f (S) (µ′′R∗wµaw for all µ′′ ∈ ϕw (a)). Then µSf (µaw) is the least preferred
admissible matching where the firm f (worker w) is matched with a feasible set of
workers S ∈ H f (with an agent a ∈ F ∪ {w}). Note that each of these least preferred
4 For instance, the condition of q -substitutability introduced by Cantala (2004).
5 Obviously, this approach is useful if the reduced problem is well defined and when the existence of stable
matching in reduced problem leads us to establish the existence of ϕ-stable matchings in the original
problem with externalities. Examples of this approach can be found in Shapley and Shubik (1969), Sasaki
and Toda (1996), Hafalir (2008) and Klaus and Klijn (2005).
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matchings is well defined, since agents’ preferences are strict and complete and by
definition the estimations functions map nonempty subsets of matchings.
Given any matching problem (F, W, P∗, q) and a set of estimation functions ’, we define
for each firm f ∈ F a preference relation Pϕf over the set of feasible sets of workers H f
in the following way: for any two different subsets of workers S, S′ ∈ H f , the preference
relation satisfies SPϕf S
′if and only if µSf P
∗
f µ
S′
f . In a similar way, for each worker w ∈W
and any pair of different agents a, a′ ∈ F ∪ {w}, the preference relation Pϕw satisfies
aPϕw a′ if and only if µawP∗wµa
′
w .
Since the preference order P∗a is complete, strict and transitive for each agent
a ∈ F ∪W, we know that Pϕa is well defined in the sense that is a complete, strict
and transitive preference relation over the set of agents on the opposite side of
the market. Hence, each matching problem with externalities (F, W, P∗, q) induces
a well defined matching problem without externalities denoted by (F, W, Pϕ, q) where
Pϕ =
(
Pϕf1 , ..., P
ϕ
fm
; Pϕw1 , ..., P
ϕ
wn
)
denotes the profile of agents’ preferences. For each agent
a ∈ F ∪W, let Rϕa denote the weak preference relation associated with Pϕa .
Example 3 Consider the matching problem already introduced in the Example 2. Take, for
instance, the feasible subsets of workers {w1, w3} and {w1, w2} for the firm f1. It is easy to show
that the least preferred matchings associated with these subsets of workers are µ{w1,w3}f1 = µ3
and µ{w1,w2}f1 = µ1. According to f1’s preferences µ3P
∗
f1
µ1, this induces a preference relation
that satisfies {w1, w3} Pϕf1 {w1, w2}. It is easy to construct the whole profile of preferences that
characterizes the reduced problem of this example:
Pϕf1 = {w1, w3} , {w1, w2} , {w2, w3} , {w1} , {w2} , φ, {w3}.
Pϕf2 = {w1, w3} , {w2, w3} , {w1, w2} , {w3} , {w1} , {w2} , φ.
We make the same exercise for the matching problem already introduced in Example 2. In
this case, we have the following profile of preferences:
Pϕf1 = {w1, w2} , φ, {w1} , {w2} , {w3} , {w2, w3} , {w1, w3}.
Pϕf2 = {w3} , {w1} , {w2} , φ.
Pϕw1 = f1, f2, w1.
Pϕw2 = f2, f1, w2.
Pϕw3 = f1, w3, f2.
As we argue before, our notion of stability for matching problem with externalities
induces a natural notion of stability for problems without externalities. Such notion of
stability depends on the following definitions.
Definition 6 A matching µ is blocked by a worker w ∈W if wPwµ (w).
Definition 7 A coalition firm-set of workers { f , S} such that S ∈ H f and µ ( f ) 6= S, blocks
the matching µ if:
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1. SPfµ ( f ) and
2. f Rwµ (w) for all w ∈ S.
A matching µ is stable in the matching problem (F, W, P, q), if it is not blocked by
any worker or coalition. Let E (F, W, P, q) denote the set of stable matchings of the
problem.
The following result is crucial to characterize the existence ϕ-stable matchings, it
basically says that any ϕ-admissible matching that is stable matching in the reduced
problem is also ϕ-stable in the original problem.
Proposition 8 Let (F, W, P∗, q) be any matching problem with externalities and ’ any set of
estimation functions. Then any matching µ that satisfies: a) µ ∈ ϕa (µ (a)) for all a ∈ F ∪W
and b) µ ∈ E (F, W, Pϕ, q) is ϕ-stable, i.e. µ ∈ E' (F, W, P∗, q).
The previous result has a crucial implication, since every matching is ϕ-admissible
under full admissibility then any stable matching of the reduced problem is also ϕ-stable.
We establish this observation as the following Corollary of the previous result.
Corollary 1 Assume that the set of estimation functions ’, satisfies full admissibility then
E (F, W, Pϕ, q) ⊂ E (F, W, P∗, q).
Note that the converse of the previous result does not necessarily hold as we show
in the following example.
Example 4 Consider a matching problem with three workers W = {w1, w2, w3} and two
firms F = { f1, f2} with quotas q f1 = q f2 = 2. Firms have the same preferences of the matching
problem in Example 2, while workers’ preferences are the following,
P∗w1 = µ9, µ14, µ15, µ16, µ11, µ12, µ13, µ10, µ1, µ8, µ7, µ4, µ5, µ6, µ3, µ2, µ17, µ23,
µ24, µ25, µ22, µ18, µ21, µ19, µ20.
P∗w2 = µ23, µ21, µ19, µ12, µ9, µ8, µ3, µ2, µ22, µ20, µ18, µ16, µ11, µ4, µ1, µ10, µ25, µ24,
µ17, µ15, µ13, µ7, µ6, µ5, µ14.
P∗w3 = µ24, µ23, µ20, µ15, µ9, µ6, µ3, µ10, µ22, µ21, µ17, µ14, µ11, µ7, µ1, µ2, µ25, µ19,
µ18, µ16, µ13, µ8, µ5, µ4, µ12.
As in previous examples, we consider a set of estimation functions that satisfies full
admissibility. Under this assumption, it is not difficult to show that the reduced problem
of this example is characterized by the following profile of preferences:
Pϕf1 = {w1, w3} , {w1, w2} , {w2, w3} , {w1} , {w2} , φ, {w3}.
Pϕf2 = {w1, w3} , {w2, w3} , {w1, w2} , {w3} , {w1} , {w2} , φ.
Pϕw1 = f2, f1, w1.
Pϕw2 = f2, f1, w2.
Pϕw3 = f1, f2, w3.
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Note that the reduced problem (F, W, Pϕ, q) of this example has no stable matchings, i.e.
E (F, W, Pϕ, q) = ∅. However, it is also easy to show that the matching µ11 = f2, f1, f2
is ϕ-stable.
In the following section, we introduce a restriction over agents’ preferences called
bottom q-substitutability that generalizes the condition of q-substitutability to matching
problems with externalities and, under full admissibility, assures the existence of ϕ-stable
matchings.
2.3.2 Bottom q-substitutability
The condition of q-substitutability (Cantala, 2004) is a restriction on firms preferences
that generalizes the well known condition of substitutability (Kelso and Crawford,
1982) to matching problems where firms have quotas of workers6. The condition of
q-substitutability guarantees the existence of stable matchings in standard many-to-one
matching problems. According to Proposition 1 (and Corollary 1) the existence of ϕ-
stable matchings can be established by imposing conditions on the matching problem
that assure the existence of stable matchings in the reduced problem. In this section,
we introduce a restriction on agents’ preferences called bottom q-substitutability that
generalizes the condition of q-substitutability to matching problems with externalities.
Before introducing this condition, we require some additional notation. For each
firm f ∈ F and any subset of feasible workers S ∈ H f , the matching µ f ,S satisfies the
following conditions: a) µ f ,S ∈ A ( f , S) and b) µ′R∗fµ f ,S for all µ′ ∈ A ( f , S). In a similar
way, for each worker w ∈ W and any agent a ∈ F ∪ {w}, the matching µw,a satisfies
the following conditions: a) µw,a ∈ A (w, a) and b) µ′R∗wµw,a for all µ′ ∈ A (w, a). Note
that the matching µ f ,S (µw,a) is the f ’s (w’s) least preferred matching where the firm f
(the worker w) and the subset of feasible workers S ∈ H f (and the agent a ∈ F ∪ {w})
are matched. Note that these matchings are well defined, since agents’ preferences are
strict and complete for all agents. Let M f =
{
µ ∈ M : µ = µ f ,S and S ∈ H f
}
denote
the set of “least preferred matchings for the firm f ” . Given the previous notation, we
are able to introduce the following definition.
Definition 8 For each firm f ∈ F and any subset of workers S ∈ 2W , the mapping Υ f : 2W →
M satisfies the following conditions:
1. Υ f (S) ∈ {µ ∈ M : µ ( f ) ⊂ S} ∩M f ; and
2. Υ f (S) R∗fµ
′ for all µ′ ∈ {µ ∈ M : µ ( f ) ⊂ S} ∩M f .
The mapping Υ f can be interpreted as the choice function of the firm f in the
presence of externalities. This mapping is defined under a min-max argument where
for any given subset of workers, firms choose the best matching among the worse
possible assignments. Note that the choice function Υ f is well defined, since the
preference relation P∗f is strict and complete for each firm f ∈ F and the set of
6 Let Pf be a preference relation of the firm f . The mapping Ch f : 2W → H f denotes the optimal choice of
the firm f . For any subset of workers S ∈ 2W , the f ’s choice function satisfies the following conditions:
a) Ch f (S) ∈ H f and b) Ch f (S) R f S′ for all S′ ⊂ S. Given any problem (F, W, P, q), we say that f ’s
preferences are q-substitutable if for any subset of workers S ∈ 2W such that w, w′ ∈ S and w 6= w′, if
w ∈ Ch f (S) then w ∈ Ch f (S {w′}).
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matchings {µ ∈ M : µ ( f ) ⊂ S} ∩ M f ⊂ M is always nonempty. For instance, it is
clear that the matching µ f ,/O belongs to this set {µ ∈ M : µ ( f ) ⊂ S} ∩ M f , since by
definition µ f ,/O ( f ) = /O ⊂ S for any subset of workers S ⊂ W. It is also clear that
{µ ∈ M : µ ( f ) ⊂ S} ∩ M f = M f whenever S = W, which implies that the choice
function Υ f (W) maps the most preferred matching among the ones in the set M f .
This choice function allows us to introduce a notion of substitutability for matching
problems with externalities.
Definition 9 We say that the preference profile P∗ in the problem (F, W, P∗, q) satisfies the
condition of bottom q−substitutability if for every firm f ∈ F and any set of workers S ∈ 2W
such that w, w′ ∈ S, if w ∈ µ ( f ) such that Υ f (S) = µ implies that w ∈ µ′ ( f ) such that
Υ f (S {w′}) = µ′.
Note that for each firm f and any feasible set of workers S ∈ H f , there exists a
unique matching in the set M f that satisfies µ ( f ) = S. Hence, under full admissibility
the profile of preferences of the reduced problem is fully characterized by the restricted
preference relation over the set of least preferred matchings M f . Thus, under full
admissibility the profile of preferences P∗ of the matching problem (F, W, P∗, q) is
bottom q−substitutable if and only if the profile of preferences Pϕ of the reduced
problem (F, W, Pϕ, q) is q−substitutable. Let BS denote the set of all preference profiles
that satisfy the condition of bottom q-substitutability. Then we establish the following
result.
Theorem 2 Let (F, W, P∗, q) be any matching problem with externalities. Suppose that P∗ ∈
BS , then under full admissibility the set of ϕ-stable matchings E (F, W, P∗, q), is not empty.
The previous result implies that the condition of bottom q-substitutability is sufficient
to assure the existence of ϕ-stable matchings but not necessary. Consider, for instance,
the following matching problem already introduced in Example 4. This matching
problem induces a reduced problem with the following agents’ preferences:
Pϕf1 = {w1, w3} , {w1, w2} , {w2, w3} , {w1} , {w2} , φ, {w3}.
Pϕf2 = {w1, w3} , {w2, w3} , {w1, w2} , {w3} , {w1} , {w2} , φ.
Pϕw1 = f2, f1, w1.
Pϕw2 = f2, f1, w2.
Pϕw3 = f1, f2, w3.
According to these preferences, the firm f1 should choose the set of workers {w1, w3}
from the set {w1, w3}. However, when only the worker w3 is available, the firm f1
prefers to choose the empty. This simple example implies that the firm f1 is not willing
to substitute the worker w1 with the worker w3. Hence, this profile of preferences is not
q-substitutable, which implies that the profile of preferences of the original problem P∗
is not bottom q-substitutable. Further, we already argue that the set of stable matchings
of this reduced problem is empty. However, under full admissibility the matching
µ11 = f2, f1, f2 is ϕ-stable.
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In the following example, we analyze a problem with bottom q-substitutable prefer-
ences that guarantees the existence of at least one ϕ-stable matching. In order to clarify
all previous concepts and notation, we analyze the problem with some detail.
Example 5 Consider a matching problem with two firms F = { f1, f2} with quotas quotas
q f1 = q f2 = 2 and three workers W = {w1, w2, w3}. The set of feasible matchings of this
problem is given in the Table 3 of Example 2. Agents’ preferences are given by the following
lists:
P∗f1 = µ6, µ4, µ5, µ8, µ1, µ7, µ2, µ20, µ24, µ23, µ15, µ18, µ22, µ16, µ11, µ25, µ21, µ19, µ17,
µ14, µ13, µ12, µ3, µ10, µ9.
P∗f2 = µ14, µ13, µ21, µ16, µ12, µ9, µ15, µ2, µ17, µ19, µ22, µ23, µ7, µ10, µ1, µ8, µ3, µ25, µ24,
µ20, µ18, µ6, µ5, µ4, µ11.
P∗w1 = µ1, µ2, µ3, µ5, µ6, µ7, µ8, µ4, µ9, µ11, µ12, µ13, µ14, µ15, µ16, µ10, µ17, µ18, µ19,
µ21, µ22, µ23, µ24, µ25, µ20.
P∗w2 = µ2, µ8, µ9, µ12, µ19, µ21, µ23, µ3, µ1, µ4, µ11, µ16, µ18, µ20, µ22, µ10, µ5, µ6, µ7,
µ13, µ15, µ17, µ24, µ25, µ14.
P∗w3 = µ2, µ7, µ11, µ14, µ17, µ21, µ22, µ1, µ3, µ6, µ9, µ15, µ20, µ23, µ24, µ10, µ4, µ5, µ8,
µ13, µ16, µ18, µ19, µ25, µ12.
As we argue before, to check if the condition of bottom q-substitutability is satisfied, it is
enough to consider the restricted firms’ preferences on the sets of matchings M f1 and M f2 :
P˜∗f1 = µ1, µ2, µ11, µ12, µ3, µ10, µ9.
P˜∗f2 = µ9, µ2, µ10, µ1, µ3, µ4, µ11.
It is easy to show that these preferences are bottom q-substitutable. Formally, we need to check
the firms’ choices for any possible subset of workers and establish the condition. For instance,
consider the case of the firm f1 and the set of workers S = {w1, w2, w3}. According to f1’s
preferences, the following holds.
Υ f1 (S) = µ1 with µ1 ( f1) = {w1, w2};
Υ f1 (S {w1}) = µ11 with µ11 ( f1) = {w2};
Υ f1 (S {w2}) = µ2 with µ2 ( f1) = {w1} and
Υ f1 (S {w3}) = µ1 with µ1 ( f1) = {w1, w2}.
However, according to our previous arguments we can also check whether the reduced problem
(F, W, Pϕ, q) has q-substitutable preferences. It is easy to show that the reduced problem of this
example has the following profile of preferences:
Pϕf1 = {w1, w2} , {w1} , {w2} , φ, {w1, w3} , {w2, w3} , {w3} .
Pϕf2 = {w1, w2} , {w2, w3} , {w1} , {w3} , {w2} , φ, {w1, w3} .
Pϕw1 = f1, f2, w1.
Pϕw2 = f2, f1, w2.
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Pϕw3 = f2, f1, w3.
It is clear that these preferences are q-substitutable, then a ϕ-stable matching exists. It is
easy to show that the matching µ2 is stable in the reduced problem (F, W, Pϕ, q). Hence, by
Corollary 1 the matching µ2 is also ϕ-stable, i.e. µ2 ∈ E (F, W, P∗, q).
2.4 pessimistic agents .
As we describe before, full admissibility is a situation where every matching is consid-
ered admissible for every agent. On the one hand, this kind of estimation functions
seem to be compatible with the absence of information about others’ expectations,
which leads agents to estimate that any matching may be considered admissible. On the
other hand, under full admissibility not only all matchings are considered admissible
but also each of the least preferred assignments of the problem. This implies that under
under full admissibility agents are pessimistic, in the sense that they consider admissible
the worse feasible matchings of the problem. Sasaki and Toda (1996) show that this
kind of pessimistic expectations may be crucial to characterize the existence of stable
assignments in matching problems with externalities.7 In this section, we introduce a
set of pessimistic estimation functions that rationalizes the expectations of pessimistic
agents and allow us to characterize the existence of ϕ-stable matchings.
Formally, agents are pessimistic whenever the set of estimation functions ϕ satisfies
the following conditions: 1) For each f ∈ F, µ f ,S∈ ϕ f (S) for all S ∈ H f and 2) for all
w ∈W, µw,a ∈ ϕw (a) for all a ∈ F∪w. Under the assumption that agents are pessimistic,
it is possible to establish the following result.
Proposition 9 Assume that agents are pessimistic, then any stable matching of the reduced
problem µ ∈ E (F, W, Pϕ, q), is not blocked by any coalition or individual worker in the
matching problem (F, W, P∗, q).
Note that the existence of ϕ-stable matchings does not come from the previous
result, since the conditions of this argument do not imply the existence of ϕ-admissible
matchings.
2.4.1 Pessimistic estimation functions
In order to rationalize the estimation functions of pessimistic agents, we consider the
following intuitive argument. Suppose that a firm f is planning to be matched with
some feasible group of workers S ∈ H f . When agents are pessimistic, the matching
µ f ,S ∈ A ( f , S) is admissible by definition, i.e. µ f ,S ∈ ϕ f (S). However, this firm f cannot
consider admissible another matching µ ∈ A ( f , S) \ {µ f ,S} that may be blocked by
some coalition, i.e. a matching for which there exists a coalition { f ′, S′} ⊂ F ∪W \ { f }
such that S′ ∈ H f ′ , whose preferences satisfy µ f ′,S′P∗f ′µ and µw′, f ′P∗w′µ for all w′ ∈ S′.
Intuitively, this firm f is able to anticipate that the matching µ ∈ A ( f , S) will be
eventually blocked by the coalition { f ′, S′}. Formally, the set of pessimistic estimation
functions is characterized by the following conditions,
7 Note that Sasaki and Toda (1996)’s non-existence argument depends on a simple example where all agents
but one are pessimistic.
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Definition 10 A matching µ is admissible for the firm f , i.e. µ ∈ ρ f (µ ( f )) if there is no
coalition { f ′, S′} ⊂ F ∪W \ { f } such that S′ ∈ H f ′ that satisfies:
1. µ f ′,S′P∗f ′µ and
2. µw′, f ′P∗w′µ for all w
′ ∈ S′;
and no subset of workers S′′ ⊂W that satisfies:
1. µw′,w′P∗w′µ for all w
′ ∈ S′′.
In a similar way,
Definition 11 A matching µ is admissible for the worker w, i.e. µ ∈ ρw (µ (w)) if there is no
coalition { f , S} ⊂ F ∪W {w} that satisfies:
1. µ f ,SP∗f µ and
2. µw, f P∗wµ for all w ∈ S;
and no subset of workers S′′ ∈W {w} such that:
1. µw′,w′P∗w′µ for all w
′ ∈ S′′.
Let æ =
{(
ρ f (·) , ρw (·)
)
: f ∈ F, w ∈W and P∗} denote the set of pessimistic estima-
tion functions. Note that this estimations depend on agents’ preferences and rationalize
the conjecture that all agents are pessimistic expectations. In general, the set of pessimistic
estimations functions æ does not satisfy the condition of full admissible as we show in the
following example.
Example 6 Consider the matching problem with externalities already introduce in Example 5.
The set of least preferred feasible matchings of the firms f1 and f2 are:
M f1 = {µ1, µ2, µ11, µ12, µ3, µ10, µ9}
M f2 = {µ9, µ2, µ10, µ1, µ3, µ4, µ11}
Consider the following set of feasible matchings A ({ f1, {w1, w2}}) = {µ1, µ4}. By assump-
tion the matching µ1 is considered admissible by the firm f1, i.e. µ1 ∈ ρ f1 ({w1, w2}). However,
the matching µ4 = f1, f1, w3 can be blocked by the coalition { f2, w3} ⊂ F ∪W \ { f1}, since
µ f2,{w3} = µ1 and µw3,{ f2} = µ1 and according to f2 and w3 preferences,
1. µ1P∗f2µ4 and
2. µ1P∗w3µ4.
Hence, the matching µ4cannot be admissible for the firm f1, i.e. µ4 /∈ ρ f1 ({w1, w2}). Sim-
ilarly, consider the set of feasible matchings A (w1, f1) = {µ1, µ2, µ3, µ4, µ5, µ6, µ7, µ8}.
As in the previous case, by assumption the matching µ4 is admissible for the firm f1, i.e.
µ4 ∈ ρw1 ( f1). However, the matching µ5 = f1, w2, w3 cannot be admissible, since the
coalition { f2, {w2, w3}} ⊂ F ∪W \ { f2} has incentives to block it. It is easy to show that,
µ f2,{w2,w3} = µ2, µw2,{ f2} = µ3 and µw2,{ f2} = µ1. And according to f2, w2 and w3 preferences,
the following is satisfied,
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1. µ2P∗f2µ5,
2. µ3P∗w2µ5 and
3. µ1P∗w3µ5.
Thus µ5 /∈ ρw1 ( f1).
The set of pessimistic estimation functions of this problem is given by the following sets of
admissible matchings for each agent.
For the firm f1:
ρ f1 ({w1, w2}) = {µ1};
ρ f1 ({w1, w3}) = {µ3};
ρ f1 ({w2, w3}) = {µ10};
ρ f1 ({w1}) = {µ2, µ7};
ρ f1 ({w2}) = {µ11, µ16, µ22};
ρ f1 ({w3}) = {µ9, µ15, µ23} and
ρ f1 (φ) = {µ12, µ13, µ14, µ17, µ19, µ21}.
For the firm f2:
ρ f2 ({w1, w2}) = {µ9, µ12};
ρ f2 ({w1, w3}) = {µ11};
ρ f2 ({w2, w3}) = {µ2};
ρ f2 ({w1}) = {µ10, µ15, µ16};
ρ f2 ({w2}) = {µ3, µ8};
ρ f2 ({w3}) = {µ1, µ7} and
ρ f2 (φ) = {µ4, µ5, µ6, µ18, µ20, µ24}.
For the worker w1:
ρw1 ( f1) = {µ1, µ2, µ3, µ4, µ7};
ρw1 ( f2) = {µ10, µ11, µ12, µ15, µ16}; and
ρw1 (w1) = {µ19, µ20, µ21, µ22}.
For the worker w2:
ρw2 ( f1) = {µ1, µ10, µ16, µ22};
ρw2 ( f2) = {µ2, µ3, µ8, µ12} and
ρw2 (w2) = {µ7, µ13, µ14}.
For the worker w3:
ρw3 ( f1) = {µ3, µ9, µ10, µ15, µ23};
ρw3 ( f2) = {µ1, µ2, µ7, µ11} and
ρw3 (w3) = {µ8, µ12, µ19}.
Note that according to these estimations neither of the following matchings:
{µ4, µ5, µ6, µ8, µ9, µ11, µ13, µ14, µ15, µ17, µ16, µ18, µ19, µ20, µ21, µ22, µ23, µ24, µ25},
is ρ-admissible.
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As we already show in Example 5, the matching µ2 = f1, f2, f2 should be stable in the
reduced problem (F, W, Pæ, q) associated with this example. According to Proposition 2,
the matching µ2 = f1, f2, f2 cannot be blocked by any worker or coalition in the original
matching problem with externalities (F, W, P∗, q), since all agents are pessimistic.
Further, note also that the matching µ2 is ρ-admissible, since µ2 ∈ ρa (µ2 (a)) for all
a ∈ F ∪W. This last observation implies that the matching µ2 is a ρ-stable matching,
i.e. µ2 ∈ Eρ (F, W, P∗, q). The following result shows that this characteristic holds in
general. In particular, we show that given the set of pessimistic estimations functions æ,
the condition of bottom q-substitutability is sufficient to assure the existence of ρ-stable
matchings.
Theorem 3 Given the set of pessimistic estimation functions æ, if P∗ ∈ BS then the set of
ρ-stable matchings, Eρ (F, W, P∗, q) is not empty.
According to the previous result, the set of pessimistic estimation functions not only
rationalize the set of matchings that pessimistic agents consider admissible but also
guarantees that every stable matching of the reduced problem will be admissible for
all agents. In contrast to the case of full admissibility, not all matchings are required to
be admissible in order to characterized the existence of ϕ-stable matchings, then the
previous example is also sufficient to establish the following results.
Proposition 10 The condition of full admissibility is neither necessary nor sufficient to assure
the existence of ϕ-stable matchings in many-to-one matching problems with externalities.
2.5 the core
The core is the set of matchings not blocked by any coalition. Sasaki and Toda (1996)
introduce a notion of the core for marriage problems with externalities. According to
this notion of the core, once externalities are considered not only the set of ϕ-stable
matchings and the core do not coincide but also the core may be empty. This results
contrast to the case of standard marriage problem where the core and the set of stable
matching always coincide.
Sasaki and Toda (1996)’s core may be empty, since in general deviating agents do
not take into account the set of matchings that they consider admissible. Under this
notion of the core, members of coalitions deviate even when they could be worse off
under admissible matchings after deviating. We propose an alternative notion of the
core by assuming that agents always consider their estimation functions when they plan
to deviate as members of any coalition. Formally,
Definition 12 A coalition A ⊂ F ∪W blocks the matching µ, whenever there is another
matching µ̂ 6= µ such that:
1. µ̂ (a) ⊂ A for all a ∈ A;
2. µ′P∗f µ for all µ
′ ∈ ϕ f (µ̂ ( f )) and all f ∈ A; and
3. µ′′P∗wµ for all µ′′ ∈ ϕw (µ̂ (w)) and all w ∈ A.
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The core given the set of estimation functions ’, or simply the ϕ-core, is the set of
ϕ-admissible matchings not blocked by any coalition A ⊂ F ∪W. Let Cϕ (F, W, P∗, q)
denote the ϕ-core. The following result provides an interesting property of the ϕ-core.
Theorem 4 Let (F, W, P∗, q) be any matching problem with externalities. Let ’ be any set of
estimation functions, then Eϕ (F, W, P∗, q) = Cϕ (F, W, P∗, q).
The previous result has some crucial implication about the existence and properties
of the core for matching problems with externalities. First of all, it is clear that all
existence results and properties of the set of ϕ-stable matchings extent to the ϕ-core.
And secondly, the equivalence between the set of ϕ-stable matchings and the ϕ-core
does not depend on the set of estimation functions.
2.6 conclusions
In this chapter, we analyze the existence of stable matchings in matching problems with
externalities. We argue that standard results about the existence of stable matchings
cannot be trivially extended. First of all, agents’ preferences should be defined over
the set of all feasible matchings of the problem instead of the set of agents on the
opposite side of the market. Once externalities are considered, agents should anticipate
the reaction of the rest of agents in the face of potential deviations.
We extend the notion of stability proposed by Sasaki and Toda (1996) based on
the concept of estimation functions. The set of estimation functions of a given problem
represents, a belief about the set of matchings that agents consider admissible given
a conjecture about the reactive behavior of agents. In general, the set of estimation
functions is not uniquely defined and may be exogenous given.
We show that in many to one problems, a ϕ-stable matchings may not exist. Further,
it is possible to find instances of the problem with no ϕ-stable matchings for any
given set of estimations. This impossibility theorem contrasts with previous results in
marriage problems with externalities, where there exists at least one set of estimations
that assures the existence of ϕ-stable matchings. Given this impossibility result, we
focus on the case of full admissibility. In this case, we provide a restriction on firms’
preferences called bottom q-substitutability that guarantees the existence of at least one
ϕ-stable matching.
Under the assumption that agents are pessimistic, it is possible to construct a set of
pessimistic estimations that rationalizes the set of estimation functions with pessimistic
agents. The set of pessimistic estimations depends on agents’ preferences and guarantees
the existence of ϕ-stable matchings, providing preferences are bottom q-substitutable. In
addition, our results show that the assumption of full admissibility is neither necessary
nor sufficient for assuring the existence of ϕ-stable matchings.
Finally, we analyze the existence of the core. In previous literature is introduced a
notion of the core which may be empty for some instances of the problem. We propose
a notion of the core where agents consider their estimation functions called ϕ-core.
We show that the set of ϕ-stable matchings and the ϕ-core coincide given any set of
estimations ’. As a final remark, it is clear that all results extent to the marriage problem
with externalities, since this is a particular case of the many-to-one matching problem.

3
A S I M P L E D E C E N T R A L I Z E D M AT C H I N G M E C H A N I S M I N
M A R K E T S W I T H C O U P L E S
3.1 introduction
Two main features characterize most of real life matching markets. First of all, most
of these markets are decentralized, i.e. the outcomes of these mechanisms depend on
the actions of individual decision-makers. Secondly, around the world the number of
couples searching jointly for a job has been increased in recent years (Klaus, Klijn and
Massó, 2007).
This chapter deals with the analysis of a simple decentralized matching mechanisms
in job markets with couples. In this setting, we analyze a mechanism called One
Application Mechanism (OA), already introduced in the context of college admissions
problems1 (Alcalde, Pérez-Castrillo and Romero-Medina, 1998).
Recent literature2 suggests that stable matchings may be expected equilibrium out-
comes of simple decentralized job markets with individual decision makers. However,
once the presence of couples is considered, it is not clear whether only stable matchings
should be expected as equilibrium outcomes. A matching market with couples has
crucial differences with respect to markets with individuals. Members of couples are
still individual decision makers but they must aggregate their individual preferences
in order to compare different pairs of job places.
In this chapter, we fully characterize the set of Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (SPE)
outcomes of the game induced by the OA, under the assumption that couples’ prefer-
ences are responsive. We show that any stable matching of the market can be achieved
as a SPE outcome of this game, but in contrast to the case of college admissions
problems unstable matchings may be supported in SPE. However, we prove that only
one special kind of instability is reasonable in equilibrium, and furthermore we show
that this kind of instability of equilibrium outcomes comes from coordination failures
between members of couples.
Our main result shows that the OA implements in SPE the set of pairwise stable
matchings of markets with couples. Finally, our characterization provides evidence
that decentralized matching mechanisms work very well and better than centralized
mechanisms for some instances of the problem, since the the National Resident Match-
ing Program (NRMP) is manipulable and may cycle around unstable matchings when
couples preferences are responsive (Klaus, Klijn and Massó, 2007).
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.2, we describe the basic
model; in Section 3.3, we analyze the matching mechanism; in Section 3.4, we compare
decentralized and centralized matching procedures; in Section 3.5, we present some
conclusions. All proofs are in the appendix C.
1 See Roth and Sotomayor (1990) for a good survey on two-sided matching literature.
2 For instance, Alcalde, Pérez-Castrillo and Romero-Medina (1998); Alcalde and Romero-Medina (2000);
Triossi (2009) and Haeringer and Wooders (2011).
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3.2 the model
Let H = {h1, ..., hn} be a finite set of n hospitals and let S = {s1, ..., sm} be a finite
set of m medical students. Assume that each hospital has only one job position and
|H| = |S| ≥ 2k for any k ≥ 1. A couple is an unordered pair of students, we denote
a typical couple by a pair c = (sk, sl) such that sk, sl ∈ S and sk 6= sl . We assume
that there is no single student, so each medical student is member of one couple.
Let C = {c1, ..., ck} denote the set of couples in the market and let ∅ and u be the
hospital’s prospect of having its position unfilled and the student’s prospect of being
unemployed, respectively. Let H = {H ∪ {u} × H ∪ {u}} {(h, h) : h ∈ H} denote the
set of all possible ordered pairs of hospitals and the prospect of being unemployed. A
typical element of the set H is denoted by (hp, hq).
Each hospital h ∈ H has a strict, transitive and complete preference relation Ph on the
set of medical students and the prospect of having a position unfilled, S ∪ {∅}. Let Rh
denote the weak preference relation induced by Ph. So for any pair of medical students
s, s′ ∈ S, the preference relation sRhs′ implies either sPhs′ or s = s′. Let PH = {Ph}h∈H
denote the preference profile of hospitals. Each couple c ∈ C has a strict, transitive and
complete preference relation Pc over the set of pairs of job positions H, as before we
denote by Rc the weak preference relation induced by Pc. Let PC = {Pc}c∈C denote the
preference profile of couples. In the following, we fix the sets of hospitals and medical
students H and S, so a market with couples is completely described by a two-tuple(
PH, PC
)
.
In order to simplify, we focus on the simplest one to one matching problem. Formally,
a matching between hospitals and medical students is defined as follows,
Definition 13 A matching µ is a mapping from H ∪ S into H ∪ S such that:
1. for all s ∈ S, if µ (s) /∈ H implies that µ (s) = u;
2. for all h ∈ H, if µ (h) /∈ S implies that µ (h) = ∅; and
3. µ (s) = h if and only if µ (h) = s.
Let M
(
PH, PC
)
denote the set of all feasible matchings in the market
(
PH, PC
)
. Now
we introduce the usual notion of stability in markets with couples. First of all, we
introduce the concept of individually rational matchings,
Definition 14 A matching µ is individually rational if,
1. for all c = (sk, sl) ∈ C, (µ (sk) , µ (sl)) Rc (µ (sk) , u), (µ (sk) , µ (sl)) Rc (u, µ (sl))
and (µ (sk) , µ (sl)) Rc (u, u); and
2. for all h ∈ H, µ (h) Rh∅.
Secondly, the we introduce the concept of blocking coalitions,
Definition 15 The coalition
(
c = (sk, sl) ,
(
hp, hq
))
blocks the matching µ if,
1.
(
hp, hq
)
Pc (µ (sk) , µ (sl)) and
2. hp ∈ H implies skRhpµ
(
hp
)
and hq ∈ H implies sl Rhqµ
(
hq
)
.
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A matching µ is stable if it is individually rational and not blocked by any coalition.
Let S
(
PH, PC
) ⊂ M (PH, PC) denote the set of stable matchings of the market (PH, PC).
It is well known that the set of stable matchings may be empty in matching markets
with couples (Roth and Sotomayor, 1990). So we assume that couples’ preferences
are responsive3 in order to assure the existence of at least one stable matching in the
problem (Klaus and Klijn, 2005; Klaus, Klijn and Nakamura, 2009). Formally,
Definition 16 A couple c = (sk, sl) has responsive preferences if there exists individual
preferences sk and sl such that for all hp, hq, hr ∈ H ∪ {u},
1. hp sk hr implies
(
hp, hq
)
Pc
(
hr, hq
)
and
2. hp sl hr implies
(
hq, hp
)
Pc
(
hq, hr
)
.
If the preference orders sk and sl exist, then they are unique.
Since the paper deals with a problem of implementation in markets with couples, we
need a description of this tool. The literature on implementation theory is well known4,
so we briefly describe the notion of an extensive form matching mechanisms and the
concept of implementation in Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (SPE). An extensive form
matching mechanism (Triossi, 2009) is an array G = 〈S ∪ H, K, A, g〉. S∪H is the set of
players, K is the set of histories and A is the strategy space. Let Z be the set of terminal
histories. Given the initial history k0, any strategy profile a ∈ A defines a unique
terminal history za ∈ Z. Let g : Z → M
(
PH, PC
)
be the outcome function, this function
specifies an outcome matching for each terminal history. A SPE is a strategy profile a∗
that induces a Nash equilibrium of every subgame. Let za∗ ∈ Z be the terminal history
induced by a SPE a∗, the matching g (za∗) is called SPE outcome of the extensive for
game induced by G, let SPE (G) denote the set of SPE outcomes of G. Let S be the set
of matching markets and let Φ : S Φ be a matching correspondence. An extensive
form matching mechanism G implements Φ in SPE if for every market
(
PH, PC
) ∈ S ,
SPE (G) = Φ
(
PH, PC
)
.
3.3 the one application mechanism
In this section, we analyze a very simple decentralized matching mechanisms already
introduced in the context of college admissions problems (Alcalde, Pérez-Castrillo and
Romero-Medina, 1998; Alcalde and Romero-Medina, 2000). Even when this mechanisms
is very simple, it mimics many real life matching procedures and allows us analyze the
strategic behavior of agents who face decentralized matching mechanisms.
This mechanism is called One Application Mechanism (OA) and runs in the fol-
lowing two stages:
3 Weaker domains of preferences assure the existence of stable matchings. For instance, the weakly
responsive preferences (Klaus and Klijn, 2005; Klaus, Klijn and Nakamura, 2009; Nakamura, 2005).
However, all relevant results in couples markets, i.e. the existence of stable matchings, the lost of the lattice
structure and the non-existence of the (hospital) student-optimal stable matching, hold under responsive
preferences. So we restrict our analysis on this domain of preferences.
4 See Maskin, E. and Sjostrom, T. (2002).
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1. Application: Each student s ∈ S sends a message, m (s) ∈ H ∪ {u}, where
m (s) = u implies that the student s prefers to remain unmatched and m (s) ∈ H
implies that s applies to some hospital h ∈ H. Let M (h) denote the set of students
who apply to the hospital h;
2. Hiring: Each hospital h ∈ H considers its proposers M (h) and the prospect of
having its position unfilled ∅. Hospitals choose an element in the set M (h)∪ {∅}.
Let Jh (M (h) ∪ {∅}) denote the choice of the hospital h from the set M (h)∪ {∅}.
Since students send at most one application and each hospital chooses at most one
candidate, the outcome of the OA is a well defined matching. The OA induces a game
in extensive form denoted by ΓOA, where S ∪ H is the set of players and at each step of
the game agents play simultaneously. In previous literature, it is shown that the OA
implements in SPE the set of stable matchings of college admissions problems (Alcalde,
Pérez-Castrillo and Romero-Medina, 1998; Alcalde and Romero-Medina, 2000).
We analyze the OA in the context of matching markets with couples, note that this
extension is not direct. First of all, a couples market is fundamentally different to the
standard matching problem, since even in the simplest setting (the one-to-one matching
problem) the existence of stable matchings is not guaranteed (Roth and Sotomayor,
1990; Gale and Shapley, 1962). So, even in the simplest setting, we need to consider
restrictions on couples’ preferences to assure the existence of stable matchings.
Second, when agents face strategically matching mechanisms, they usually evaluate
outcomes and possible deviations through individual preferences, thus the presence
of couples introduces an additional problem. In a market with couples, we usually
specify couples’ preferences without considering individual preferences, since it is
considered that individuals aggregate their preferences and only consider the welfare
of the couple. Hence, we have to analyze a problem with individual strategic decision
makers in a setting where agents evaluate outcomes (and possible deviations) through
couples’ preferences.
We introduce these characteristics of matching markets with couples in our analysis.
First of all, we introduce some additional notation. For any given market with couples(
PH, PC
)
, let’s define for each hospital h ∈ H, the h’s choice function as follows.
Definition 17 For any S′ ⊂ S, the h’s choice function Ch : S′ ∪ {∅} → S′ ∪ {∅} satisfies
the following:
1. Ch (S′ ∪ {∅}) ∈ S′ ∪ {∅} and
2. Ch (S′ ∪ {∅}) Rhx for all x ∈ S′ ∪ {∅}.
We are interested in characterizing the set of SPE (in pure strategies) outcomes
of the game ΓOA induced by the mechanism. First of all, we consider the strategic
behavior of hospitals. In this game, each hospital has a dominant strategy that coincides
with the decision rule Jh (·) = Ch (·), clearly this rule is optimal and independent on
the strategies of all other agents. It is obvious that, at the last stage of the OA the
best strategy for a hospital is to choose the best medical student among the available
applicants. Clearly, at any SPE of the game ΓOA, hospitals must follow their dominant
strategy Ch (·).
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Given the profile of optimal choice rules J∗ = {Ch (·)}h∈H, the OA induces a n-
players game in strategic form GOA =
(
S, {H ∪ {s}}s∈S , PC
)
played by medical stu-
dents. Note that the extensive form game ΓOA has a SPE in pure strategies if and only
if the associated strategic form game GOA has a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies.
Observe that under the OA, any equilibrium in pure strategies of the game ΓOA yields
a well defined matching, otherwise students must play mixed strategies and choose a
probability distribution over the set of actions H ∪ {s}.
Before introducing our main results, we consider a simple example to show the diffi-
culties of the problem that come from the strategic behavior of medical students. Con-
sider the following market with couples
(
PH, PC
)
with four hospitals and four students.
There are two couples in the market: c1 = (s1, s2) and c2 = (s3, s4). Hospitals’ and cou-
ples’ preferences are described in Table 5, assume that these preferences are completed
to be strictly unemployment averse, i.e. for each couple c ∈ C and all pair of hospitals
hp, hq 6= u, it is satisfied
(
hp, hq
)
Pc
(
hp, u
)
Pc (u, u) and
(
hp, hq
)
Pc
(
u, hq
)
Pc (u, u).
Table 5: Agent Preferences
PH PC
h1 h2 h3 h4 c1 = (s1, s2) c1 = (s1, s2)
s4 s4 s2 s2 (h1, h2) (h4, h2)
s2 s3 s3 s4 (h4, h1) (h4, h3)
s1 s2 s1 s1 (h4, h3) (h4, h1)
s3 s1 s4 s3 (h4, h2) (h3, h1)
∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ (h1, h4) (h3, h2)
(h1, h3) (h3, h4)
(h3, h4) (h2, h4)
(h3, h1) (h2, h1)
(h3, h2) (h2, h3)
(h2, h3) (h1, h2)
(h2, h4) (h1, h4)
(h2, h1) (h1, h3)
. .
In order to simplify, we describe a matching by a four entry vector that specifies
the partner of each hospital in the order (h1, h2, h3, h4), so for instance, the matching
µ = (s1, s2, s3, s4) implies that µ (h1) = s1, µ (h2) = s2 and so on. Note that according to
Table 5, couples do not have responsive preferences, further the set of stable matchings
of this market is empty. Under these conditions, we establish the next result.
Claim 1 Consider the market with couples with preferences described in Table 5, then there is
no Nash equilibrium in pure strategies of the game GSH =
(
S, {H ∪ {s}}s∈S , PC
)
induced by
the OA.
Claim 1 has an interesting implication, since it shows that no matching of the previous
example can be sustained in SPE (in pure strategies). Since GSH =
(
S, {H ∪ {s}}s∈S , PC
)
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is a strategic form game, there has to exist at least one Nash equilibrium in mixed
strategies with a proper specification of utility functions. However, the result implies
that no matching of this problem can be considered a reasonable outcome of the
market. In the following result, we show that this problem disappears when couples’
preferences are responsive5.
Proposition 11 Let
(
PH, PC
)
be a market with couples where couples’ preferences are respon-
sive, then any stable matching of the market can be achieved as a SPE outcome of the game
induced by the OA.
This result is consistent with previous findings in the context of college admission
problems6. However, a natural question is whether only stable matchings can be
expected SPE outcomes of the OA. The answer to this question is negative, as we show
in the following example the mechanism may achieve unstable matchings in SPE.
Example 7 Consider a 4x4 market with couples with c1 = (s1, s2) and c2 = (s3, s4) with the
following preferences,
Table 6: Agent Preferences
PH PC
h1 h2 h3 h4 c1 = (s1, s2) c1 = (s1, s2)
s2 s3 s1 s2 (h3, h1) (h4, h2)
s3 s4 s3 s3 (h1, h2) (h4, h3)
s4 s1 s4 s1 (h4, h1) (h4, h1)
s1 s2 s2 s4 (h2, h1) (h3, h2)
∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ (h3, h2) (h3, h4)
(h1, h3) (h3, h1)
(h4, h2) (h1, h2)
(h2, h3) (h1, h4)
(h3, h4) (h1, h3)
(h1, h4) (h2, h4)
(h4, h3) (h2, h1)
(h2, h4) (h2, h3)
. .
Couples’ preferences in Table 6 are completed to be responsive. According to
Proposition 1, stable matchings of this problem such as µ9 = (s2, s3, s1, s4) and
µ11 = (s2, s4, s1, s3) can be supported as SPE outcomes of the game ΓOA.
We want to show that not only stable matchings can be achieved in SPE. For this
purpose, consider that hospitals follow their dominant strategy, i.e. each h ∈ H follows
5 Recall that responsiveness is sufficient, but not necessary to assure the existence of stable matching. The
result of Proposition 1 is even more general and holds for any market
(
PH , PC
)
where S
(
PH , PC
) 6= ∅.
6 See, Alcalde, Pérez-Castrillo and Romero-Medina (1998), Alcalde and Romero-Medina (2000) and Triossi
(2009).
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the choice rule Ch (·). Let m be a profile of students’ messages that satisfies: m (s1) = h1,
m (s2) = h3, m (s3) = h4 and m (s4) = h2. Clearly, the outcome of this strategy profile is
the matching µ5 = (s1, s4, s2, s3).
We show that the profile of messages m is a Nash equilibrium of the game GSH
and as consequence a SPE of the game induced by the OA. Note that neither of the
medical students s3 and s4 would like to deviate from the profile m, since the pair of
job positions (h4, h2) is the top choice of the couple c2 = (s3, s4). Note also that for
the student s1, there is no hp ∈ H ∪ {u} such that
(
hp, µ5 (s2)
) c1 (µ5 (s1) , µ5 (s2)),
hence there is no profitable deviation for s1. Now consider the case of the student
s2. Note that only the hospital h2 is a candidate for a profitable deviation, since
(µ5 (s1) , h2) c1 (µ5 (s1) , µ5 (s2)). However, if the student s2 deviates with an alterna-
tive message m′ (s2) = h2, the hospital h2 (following the optimal choice rule Ch2 (·))
will choose the medical student s4. Hence, s2 will be unmatched after deviating and
(µ5 (s1) , µ5 (s2)) c1 (µ5 (s1) , u) by responsiveness. Then, there is no profitable devi-
ation for any student which implies that the matching µ5 = (s1, s4, s2, s3) is a Nash
equilibrium outcome of the game GSH and by construction a SPE outcome of the game
ΓOA. However, note that the matching µ5 is not stable, since it is blocked by the coalition
{c1 = (s1, s2) , (h3, h1)} which by blocking induces the matching µ11 = (s2, s4, s1, s3).
This feature of markets with couples contrasts with previous findings in college
admission problems. However, the equilibrium outcomes of the OA can be unstable in
a very particular fashion, since the matching µ5 = (s1, s4, s2, s3) is blocked only by the
coalition {c1 = (s1, s2) , (h3, h1)}. Note that this blocking coalition has a very particular
structure, since the couple c1 = (s1, s2) and hospitals h1 and h3 are able to block the
matching µ5, because the members of the couple c1 = (s1, s2) can exchange their
positions in a profitable way for all students and hospitals in this coalition. Hence, if
members of the couple c1 = (s1, s2) coordinate their strategies such that s1 applies to h3
and s2 applies to h1, the outcome of the OA would be the matching µ11 = (s2, s4, s1, s3)
which is stable. So µ5 is a SPE outcome of the OA because there is a coordination
failure between the members of the couple c1. In the following result, we show that
this feature of markets with couples is general, since only this kind of instability is
admissible in SPE.
Proposition 12 Let
(
PH, PC
)
be a market with couples whose couples’ preferences are respon-
sive, then any SPE outcome of the game induced by the OA is a matching that is either stable
or blocked by some coalition of the form: {c = (sk, sl) , (µ (sl) , µ (sk))}.
In the rest of this section, we show that the instability of SPE outcomes of the OA is
compatible with another well known notion of stability. First of all, we introduce the
formal definition of the concept of pairwise stability,
Definition 18 A matching µ is blocked by a pair
(
hp, sk
)
such that hp ∈ H ∪ {u} and sk ∈ S
if,
1.
(
hp, µ (sl)
)
Pc (µ (sk) , µ (sl)) and
2. skPhpµ
(
hp
)
.
In a similar way, a matching µ is blocked by a pair
(
hq, sl
)
such that hq ∈ H ∪ {u} and
sl ∈ S. A matching µ is pairwise stable, if it is individually rational and not blocked
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by any pair. It is clear that the notion of pairwise stability is weaker than the usual
notion of stability in markets with couples. Note that any unstable matching that is
blocked only by coalitions of the form {c = (sk, sl) , (µ (sl) , µ (sk))} is pairwise stable.
This observation allows us to establish the following result.
Theorem 5 Let
(
PH, PC
)
be a market with couples where couples’ preferences are responsive,
then the OA implements in SPE the set of pairwise stable matchings of the market.
The proof of Theorem 1 comes directly from Propositions 1 and 2. This result has a
crucial implication, since it shows that the possible instability of SPE outcomes of the
OA is not so strong. Only instabilities that come from coordination failures between
members of couples are reasonable when agents face strategically the OA. Further,
those instabilities are compatible with the notion of pairwise stability in matching
problems.
Note that along the paper, we have not assumed any coordination among agents,
since usually it is very difficult to justify this coordination in strategic environments.
However, the coordination of actions between members of a couple is very reasonable
and natural in many economic situations. So, it is not difficult to argue that only stable
matchings will be reasonable equilibrium outcomes of the OA.
3.4 decentralized vs centralized mechanisms
Our main result shows that only pairwise stable matchings can be expected equilibrium
outcomes when agents face strategically simple decentralized matching mechanisms in
markets with couples. This result contrasts with the case of centralized mechanisms.
One of the most popular and analyzed centralized matching procedures is the National
Resident Matching Program7 (NRMP). Klaus, Klijn and Massó (2007) analyze the new
NRMP algorithm which introduces the presence of couples in the market for new
medical students. They show that the NRMP may achieve unstable matchings when
couples preferences are responsive. To illustrate the problem consider a simple 4 by 4
matching problem with preferences given in Table 7.
Couples’ preferences are completed to be responsive, this assumption implies that
there exists at least one stable matching. Klaus, Klijn and Massó (2007) apply that
new NRMP algorithm to the previous example and find that this algorithm cycles
around the unstable matching µ = (∅, s3, s4,∅). Note that the matching µ is neither
stable nor pairwise stable, since the coalition (s1, h1) blocks µ. According to Theorem
1, µ cannot be supported by any SPE under the OA. If the stability of outcome
matchings measures the success of a matching mechanism, our main result shows
that decentralized matching mechanisms work very well and better than centralized
mechanisms for some instances of matching markets with couples.
7 The National Resident Matching Program (NRMP) is a centralized mechanism where is applied an
algorithm to match hospitals and medical students in the USA. The purpose of the NRMP is matching
hospitals and physician in a stable way, in this algorithm the presence of couples has been explicitly
incorporated. See Roth, A. (1984) and Roth, A. (2008) to have a clear idea about the importance of the
market of new physicians in the theory of market design.
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Table 7: Agent Preferences
PH PC
h1 h2 h3 h4 c1 = (s1, s2) c2 = (s3, s4)
s2 s2 s2 s2 (h1, h2) (h2, h3)
s3 s3 s3 s3 (h1, h3) (h2, h4)
s1 s1 s1 s1 (h1, h4) (h2, h1)
s4 s4 s4 s4 (h2, h1) (h1, h3)
∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ (h2, h3) (h1, h4)
(h2, h4) (h1, h2)
(h3, h1) (h3, h4)
(h3, h2) (h3, h2)
(h3, h4) (h3, h1)
(h4, h1) (h4, h3)
(h4, h2) (h4, h2)
(h4, h3) (h4, h1)
. .
3.5 conclusions
We show that a simple decentralized matching mechanisms, like the OA, implements
in SPE the set of pairwise stable matchings of couples markets. In contrast with the
NRMP algorithm, only pairwise stable matchings are expected SPE outcomes of the
OA. Given the usual notion of stability in couples markets, we show that the OA may
attain unstable matchings in equilibrium. However, we show that this instability is
very particular and comes exclusively from coordination failures between members of
couples.

A
A P P E N D I X A : P R O O F S O F C H A P T E R 1
a.0.1 The signaling equilibrium
The maximization problem of any student with parameter α is:
max
P1≥0
{
M
∑
k=1
vk
(
N − 1
k− 1
)
F
(
ρ−1N (P1)
)N−k [
1− F
(
ρ−1N (P1)
)]k−1 − c (P1)
φ (α)
}
(25)
Let’s define the function ϕ (x, N, k) = F (x)N−k [1− F (x)]k−1. Hence, for each k ∈
{2, ..., N − 1} it is satisfied the following,
ϕ′ (x, N, k) = [(N − k) (1− F (x))− (k− 1) F (x)] F (x)N−1−k [1− F (x)]k−2 f (x) .
(26)
Hence, the FOC of the payoff function pi (α, P1) with respect to P1 is given by,

v1 (N − 1) F
(
ρ−1N (P1)
)N−2 f (ρ−1N (P1))
ρ′N(ρ
−1
N (P1))
+
M
∑
k=2
vk(N − k)(N−1k−1 )F
(
ρ−1N (P1)
)N−1−k [
1− F
(
ρ−1N (P1)
)]k−1 f (ρ−1N (P1))
ρ′N(ρ
−1
N (P1))
−
− M∑
k=2
vk (k− 1) (N−1k−1 )F
(
ρ−1N (P1)
)N−k [
1− F
(
ρ−1N (P1)
)]k−2 f (ρ−1N (P1))
ρ′N(ρ
−1
N (P1))

− c
′ (P1)
φ (α)
= 0 (27)
In a symmetric equilibrium it is satisfied P1 = ρM (α), then
v1 (N − 1) φ (α) F (α)N−2 f (α) +
+
M
∑
k=2
vk (N − k) (N−1k−1 )φ (α) F (α)N−1−k [1− F (α)]k−1 f (α)−
− M∑
k=2
vk (k− 1) (N−1k−1 )φ (α) F (α)N−k [1− F (α)]k−2 f (α)

= c′ (ρN (α)) ρ′N (α) (28)
By reordering and solving this differential equation with the initial condition
ρM (0) = 0, we find that the signaling strategy ρM (α) satisfies,
ρM (α) = c−1
 (N − 1) M−1∑k=1 (vk − vk+1) (N−2k−1 ) ∫ α0 φ (x) F (x)N−1−k [1− F (x)]k−1 f (x) dx + ...
...+ (N − 1) vM(N−2M−1)
∫ α
0 φ (x) F (x)
N−M−1 [1− F (x)]M−1 f (x) dx
 (29)
This completes the maximization problem of any student with parameter α. Note
that (N − 1) (N−2k−1 ) = (N−1)!(k−1)!(N−1−k)! , then we can re-write this signaling strategy as
follows,
ρM (α) = c−1
(
M−1
∑
k=1
(vk − vk+1)
∫ α
0
φ (x) f(k,N−1) (x) dx + vM
∫ α
0
φ (x) f(M,N−1) (x) dx
)
(30)
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Where f(k,N−1) (x) =
(N−1)!
(k−1)!(N−1−k)! F (x)
N−1−k [1− F (x)]k−1 f (x) for k = 1, ..., M.
Note that f(k,N−1) (x) is the density probability function of the x-th highest order
statistic from an iid sample of size N − 1.
Proof of proposition 2:
Consider that any student with parameter α is planing to deviate from the signaling
strategy ρM (α) by choosing an alternative score P′. Assume w.l.g. that 0 ≤ P′ < ρM (α),
since the signaling strategy is strictly increasing in α there exists a unique 0 ≤ α′ < α
such that P′ = ρM (α′). Then by choosing the score P′ the student gets the expected
payoff pi (α, P′) = pi (α, ρM (α′)) given by,
pi
(
α, ρM
(
α′
))
=
M
∑
k=1
vk
(
N − 1
k− 1
)
F
(
α′
)N−k [1− F (α′)]k−1 − c (ρM (α′))
φ (α)
(31)
By deviating to P′, the student losses the extra payoff,
pi (α, ρM (α))− pi
(
α, ρM
(
α′
))
=

M
∑
k=1
vk(
N−1
k−1 )
(
F (α)N−k [1− F (α)]k−1 − F (α′)N−k [1− F (α′)]k−1
)
−
− 1
φ(α) (c (ρM (α))− c (ρM (α′)))
(32)
Note that the increment in the signaling cost c (ρM (α))− c (ρM (α′)) is positive and
can be written as,
c (ρM (α))− c
(
ρM
(
α′
))
=
M−1
∑
k=1
(vk − vk+1)
∫ α
α′
φ (x) f(k,N−1) (x) dx + vM
∫ α
α′
φ (x) f(M,N−1) (x) dx (33)
Since φ (x) is strictly increasing and positive in x, it is clear that
1
φ (α)
(
c (ρM (α))− c
(
ρM
(
α′
)))
<
M−1
∑
k=1
(vk − vk+1)
∫ α
α′
f(k,N−1) (x) dx + vM
∫ α
α′
f(M,N−1) (x) dx (34)
Note that by reordering the previous equation, we find that the following condition
holds,
1
φ (α)
(
c (ρM (α))− c
(
ρM
(
α′
)))
< (N − 1) v1
∫ α
0
F (x)N−2 f (x) dx +
M
∑
k=2
vk
(
N − 1
k− 1
) ∫ α
0
ϕ′ (x, N, k) dx (35)
Note that for any k ∈ {2, ..., N − 1}, it holds∫ α
α′
ϕ′ (x, N, k) dx = F (α)N−k [1− F (α)]k−1 − F (α′)N−k [1− F (α′)]k−1 (36)
Which implies that pi (α, ρM (α))− pi (α, ρM (α′)) > 0. By a similar argument, it is
possible to show that any deviation P′ > ρN (·) cannot be a profitable deviation. This
completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 3:
• ρM (α) is strictly increasing in α and bounded above.
To prove that the signaling strategy ρM (α) is strictly increasing in α, it is enough
to show that the function c (ρM (α)) is strictly increasing in α, since c (·) is a strictly
increasing function. Then
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d
dα
(c (ρM (α))) =
 (N − 1)
M−1
∑
k=1
(vk − vk+1) (N−2k−1 )φ (α) F (α)N−1−k [1− F (α)]k−1 f (α) + ...
...+ (N − 1) vM(N−2M−1)φ (α) F (α)N−M−1 [1− F (α)]M−1 f (α)
(37)
It is clear that ddα (c (ρM (α))) > 0 for all α, as we desired. To prove that signaling
strategy ρM (α) is bounded above, we use the the fact that this function can be written
as follows,
c (ρM (α)) =
M−1
∑
k=1
(vk − vk+1)
∫ α
0
φ (x) f(k,N−1) (x) dx + vM
∫ α
0
φ (x) f(M,N−1) (x) dx (38)
Where f(k,N−1) (x) is the density function of the k − th order statistic from an
N − 1 sample with distribution function F (x) such that x(1,N−1) = max
1≤i≤N−1
{xi},
x(2,N−1)=second greatest in {xi}N−1i=1 and so on. Since φ (x) is strictly increasing and
bounded in [0, w], we know that
c (ρM (α)) ≤ φ (w)
(
M−1
∑
k=1
(vk − vk+1)
∫ w
0
f(k,N−1) (x) dx + vM
∫ w
0
f(M,N−1) (x) dx
)
(39)
But by definition
∫ w
0 f(k,N−1) (x) dx = 1 for all k = 1, ..., M. Then
c (ρM (α)) ≤ φ (w)
(
M−1
∑
k=1
(vk − vk+1) + vM
)
< ∞ (40)
• pi (α, ρM (α)) is strictly increasing in α .
Now we want to show that the equilibrium payoff pi (α, ρM (α)) is strictly increasing in
α. To prove this property, we calculate the derivative of the payoff function with respect
to α. Then
d
dα
(pi (α, ρM (α))) =

(N − 1) v1F (α)N−2 f (α) +
M
∑
k=2
vk(
N−1
k−1 )ϕ
′ (α)−
− 1
φ(α)2
(
φ (α) ddα (c (ρM (α)))− c (ρM (α)) φ′ (α)
) (41)
By reordering the previous expression, it is easy to show that
d
dα
(pi (α, ρM (α))) =
c (ρM (α)) φ′ (α)
φ (α)2
> 0 (42)
This completes the proof.
a.0.2 Comparative statics
Proof of Proposition 4:
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Let ρM (α, N) be the equilibrium signaling strategy of any college admissions problem
with M ≥ 1 colleges and N > M students. Since the cost function c (·) is strictly
increasing, it is enough to show that the function c (ρM (α, N)) satisfies the desired
properties. Then, it is easy to show that the difference c (ρM (α, N + 1))− c (ρM (α, N))
is equal to
M−1
∑
k=1
(vk − vk+1)
∫ α
0
(
N(N−1k−1 )F (x)− (N − 1) (N−2k−1 )
)
φ (x) F (x)N−1−k [1− F (x)]k−1 f (x) dx + ...
...+ vM
∫ α
0
(
N(N−1M−1)F (x)− (N − 1) (N−2M−1)
)
φ (x) F (x)N−M−1 [1− F (x)]M−1 f (x) dx
(43)
Given that (N − 1) (N−2k−1 ) = (N − k) (N−1k−1 ), the previous equation reduces to the
following,

M−1
∑
k=1
(vk − vk+1) (N−1k−1 )
∫ α
0 (NF (x)− (N − k)) φ (x) F (x)N−1−k [1− F (x)]k−1 f (x) dx + ...
...+ vM(
N−1
M−1)
∫ α
0 (NF (x)− (N −M)) φ (x) F (x)N−M−1 [1− F (x)]M−1 f (x) dx
(44)
Then, it is clear that c (ρM (α, N + 1))− c (ρM (α, N)) < 0 if α ≤ αN (N) where αN (N)
is the unique solution to the equation,
F (x) = 1− M
N
(45)
Further, the threshold αN (N) is monotone increasing in N, i.e. αN (N + 1) > αN (N)
for all N > M. This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 5:
Consider the equilibrium signaling strategy of any college admissions problem with
one college with M ≥ 2 school seats and N ≥ M + 2 students.
ρM (α, M) = c−1
(
(N − 1) v1(N−2M−1)
∫ α
0 φ (x) F (x)
N−1−M [1− F (x)]M−1 f (x) dx
)
(46)
Since the function c (·) is strictly increasing, to prove this result we focus on the
function c (ρM (α, M)). Then, it is easy to show that the difference c (ρM (α, M + 1))−
c (ρM (α, M)) is equal to
v1 (N − 1)
∫ α
0
((
N − 2
M
)
(1− F (x))−
(
N − 2
M− 1
)
F (x)
)
φ (x) F (x)N−2−M [1− F (x)]M−1 f (x) dx (47)
By reordering and applying the identity (Nk ) = (
N−1
k−1 ) + (
N−1
k ), the previous equation
reduces to the following,
v1 (N − 1)
∫ α
0
((
N − 2
M
)
−
(
N − 1
M
)
F (x)
)
φ (x) F (x)N−2−M [1− F (x)]M−1 f (x) dx (48)
Given that (N−1M ) =
N−1
N−1−M (
N−2
M ) , we get
v1 (N − 1)
(
N − 2
M
) ∫ α
0
(
1− N − 1
N − 1−M F (x)
)
φ (x) F (x)N−2−M [1− F (x)]M−1 f (x) dx
(49)
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Then, it is clear that c (ρM (α, M + 1))− c (ρM (α, M)) > 0 if α ≤ αN (M, N) where
αM (M, N) is the unique solution to the equation,
F (x) = 1− N − 1−M
N − 1 (50)
Further, it is clear that the threshold αM (M, N) is monotone increasing in N and
monotone decreasing in M. This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 6:
We analyze the effect of a change in the quality of the college ck, then we consider that
the equilibrium signaling strategy depends on the quality of this college, i.e. ρM (α, vk).
We know that the equilibrium signaling strategy satisfies the equation,
c (ρM (α, vk)) = (N − 1) v1
∫ α
0
φ (x) F (x)N−2 f (x) dx +
M
∑
k=2
vk
(
N − 1
k− 1
) ∫ α
0
φ (x) ϕ′ (x, N, k) dx (51)
Consider a change in the quality of the college ck such that vk−1 > v′k > vk+1,
i.e. a change in college qualities that preserve students’ ordinal preferences. It is not
difficult to show that the difference c
(
ρM
(
α, v′k
))− c (ρM (α, vk)) satisfies the following
equation for k = 2, ..., M,
c
(
ρM
(
α, v′k
))− c (ρM (α, vk)) = (v′k − vk) (N − 1k− 1
) ∫ α
0
φ (x) ϕ′ (x, N, k) dx (52)
Since ϕ′ (x, N, k) = [(N − k) (1− F (x))− (k− 1) F (x)] F (x)N−1−k [1− F (x)]k−2 f (x),
it is easy to show that whenever α ≤ αvk (N, k)
sgn
(
c
(
ρM
(
α, v′k
))− c (ρM (α, vk))) = sgn (v′k − vk) (53)
Where αvk (N, k) is the unique solution to the equation,
F (x) =
N − k
N − 1 (54)
Further, it is easy to observe that the threshold αvk (N, k) is monotone increasing in
N for all k = 2, ..., M and monotone decreasing in k. This completes the proof.
a.0.3 Gains of the CSM
If α is distributed according to an exponential distribution function f (α; θ) = 1θ e
− αθ for
α ∈ [0,∞) and θ > 0, then
1. E [α] = θ and
2. E
[
α(j)
]
=
N+1−j
∑
k=1
θ
N+1−k for j = 1, ..., N.
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where α(1) = max
1≤i≤N
αi, α(2)=second greatest in {αi}N−1i=1 and so on (Huang, 1974). Con-
sider any M by N college admissions problem such that N > M ≥ 1, then colleges’
gains satisfy,
∆EQ (j, N) = θ
N+1−j
∑
k=1
1
N + 1− k − θ
(
N − 1
N
)j−1
. (55)
Assume w.l.g. that θ = 1. We establish the following auxiliary results.
Claim 2 The continuous function f (x) =
( x−1
x
)j−1 is strictly increasing and strictly concave
in x for all x > j ≥ 3.
Proof. To prove this result, we simply take the first and second derivative of the
function f (x) =
( x−1
x
)j−1
. Then it is easy to show the following:
1. f ′ (x) =
(
j−1
x2
) ( x−1
x
)j−2
> 0; and
2. f ′′ (x) =
(
j−1
x4
) ( x−1
x
)j−3
(j− 2x) < 0.
For all x > j ≥ 3, this completes the proof.
Lemma 2 ∆EQ (j, N) > ∆EQ (j + 1, N) for all j = 1, ..., M− 1.
Proof. It is not difficult to show that the difference ∆EQ (j, N)−∆EQ (j + 1, N) satisfies
the following,
∆EQ (j, N)− ∆EQ (j + 1, N) = 1
j
−
(
N − 1
N
)j−1 ( 1
N
)
(56)
Since,
(N−1
N
)j−1 ≤ 1 for all j ≥ 1, we know that
∆EQ (j, N)− ∆EQ (j + 1, N) ≥ 1
j
− 1
N
=
N − j
jN
. (57)
Since N > M ≥ j, ∆EQ (j, N)− ∆EQ (j + 1, N) > 0 for j = 1, ..., M− 1. This com-
pletes the proof.
Lemma 3 ∆EQ (j, N) is strictly monotone increasing in N > M for all j = 1, ..., M.
Proof. Consider the following function for a given j = 1, ..., M,
∆EQ (j, N + 1)− ∆EQ (j, N) =

N+2−j
∑
k=1
1
N+2−k −
N+1−j
∑
k=1
1
N+1−k−
−
[(
N
N+1
)j−1 − (N−1N )j−1] (58)
By simplifying, we can get the following expression,
∆EQ (j, N + 1)− ∆EQ (j, N) = 1
N + 1
−
((
N
N + 1
)j−1
−
(
N − 1
N
)j−1)
(59)
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It is not difficult to show by a direct inspection that ∆EQ (j, N + 1)− ∆EQ (j, N) > 0
for j = 1, 2. Now consider the case of any j such that N > M ≥ j ≥ 3. By the Claim 1,
we know that
f ′(N) ≥
(
N
N + 1
)j−1
−
(
N − 1
N
)j−1
(60)
where f (x) =
( x−1
x
)j−1
such that x > j ≥ 3. Hence,
∆EQ (j, N + 1)− ∆EQ (j, N) ≥ 1
N + 1
−
(
j− 1
N2
)(
N − 1
N
)j−2
(61)
Since
(N−1
N
)j−2 ≤ 1 for all j ≥ 2, we know that
∆EQ (j, N + 1)− ∆EQ (j, N) ≥ 1
N + 1
− j− 1
N2
=
N2 − (j− 1) (N + 1)
N2 (N + 1)
. (62)
Given that N > M ≥ j ≥ 3 and (N − 1) (N + 1) > (j− 1) (N + 1), we conclude that
∆EQ (j, N + 1)− ∆EQ (j, N) > 1
N2 (N + 1)
. (63)
Then ∆EQ (j, N + 1)− ∆EQ (j, N) > 0 for all N > M ≥ j ≥ 3. This completes the
proof.
Proof of Proposition 7
Properties 1 and 2 of colleges gains ∆EQ (j, N) come directly from Lemmas 1 and 2.
For the third property, assume that ∆EQ (M, N) ≥ 0 for N = M + 1, then N∗ = M + 1.
By Lemma 2, ∆EQ (M, N) ≥ 0 for all N ≥ N∗ > M. By Lemma 1, ∆EQ (j, N) ≥ 0 for
all j = 1, ..., M provided ∆EQ (M, N) ≥ 0. Then ∆EQ (j, N) ≥ 0 for all N ≥ N∗ and
j = 1, ..., M.
Now suppose that ∆EQ (M, N) < 0 for N = M + 1. Note that,
1. lim
N→∞
(N−1
N
)M−1
= 1 for all M ≥ 1; and
2. lim
N→∞
E
[
α(M)
]
= lim
N→∞
N+1−M
∑
k=1
1
N+1−k = ∞.
Then there exists a N∗ > M such that ∆EQ (M, N∗) ≥ 0. Then by Lemmas 1 and 2,
∆EQ (j, N) ≥ 0 for all N ≥ N∗ and j = 1, ..., M. This completes the proof.

B
A P P E N D I X B : P R O O F S O F C H A P T E R 2
Proof of Lemma 1:
Proof. Suppose that E (F, W, P∗, q) = Ø, while Eϕ∗ (F, W, P∗, q) 6= Ø for an arbitrary
set of estimations ’∗. Consider any matching µ ∈ Eϕ∗ (F, W, P∗, q), this matching is ϕ∗-
admissible and not blocked by any worker or coalition given ’∗. Since E (F, W, P∗, q) =
Ø, we have two cases under full admissibility:
Case 1: The matching µ is blocked by at least one coalition { f , S} such that S ∈ H f .
Hence, it is satisfied 1. µ′P∗f µ for all µ
′ ∈ A ( f , S) and 2. µ′′P∗wµ for all µ′′ ∈ A (w, f )
and all w ∈ S. By definition, ϕ∗f (S) ⊂ A ( f , S) and ϕ∗w ( f ) ⊂ A (w, f ) for all f and w in
F ∪W. Then it is clear that a) µ′P∗f µ for all µ′ ∈ ϕ∗f (S) and b) µ′′P∗wµ for all µ′′ ∈ ϕ∗w ( f )
and all w ∈ S. A contradiction.
Case 2: The matching µ is blocked by some worker w ∈ W. Then µ (w) 6= w and
µ′P∗wµ for all µ′ ∈ A (w, w), this implies that µ′P∗wµ for all µ′ ∈ ϕ∗w (w). A contradiction,
this completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 8:
Proof. Assume that the matching µ is blocked by some { f , S} such that S ∈ H f in the
problem (F, W, P∗, q) but stable in the reduced problem, i.e. µ ∈ E (F, W, Pϕ, q). If µ′P∗f µ
for all µ′ ∈ ϕ f (S) implies that µSf P∗f µ, since µ ∈ ϕa (µ (a)) for all a ∈ F ∪W. We know
that µR∗fµ
µ( f )
f , hence µ
S
f P
∗
f µ
µ( f )
f which implies SP
ϕ
f µ ( f ). Assume that there is some
worker w ∈ µ ( f ) ∩ S, this implies that µ (w) = { f } and by assumption µ ∈ ϕw (µ (w)).
Since µ is blocked by { f , S}, we know that µ′′P∗w′µ for all µ′′ ∈ ϕw′ ( f ) and all w′ ∈ S.
It is impossible that µ ∈ ϕw ( f ), hence µ ( f ) ∩ S = φ. If µ′′P∗wµ for all µ′′ ∈ ϕw ( f )
implies that µ fwP∗wµ, since µ ∈ ϕa (µ (a)) for all a ∈ F ∪W. We know that µR∗wµµ(w)w ,
hence µ fwP∗wµ
µ(w)
w which implies that f P
ϕ
wµ (w) for all w ∈ S. These conditions imply
that µ ( f ) 6= S, a) SPϕf µ ( f ) and b) f Pϕwµ (w) for all w ∈ S, a contradiction.
Now assume that µ is blocked by an individual worker w ∈ W. In this case, we
have that µ (w) 6= w and µ′P∗wµ for all µ′ ∈ ϕw (w). By a similar argument this implies
µwwP∗wµ
µ(w)
w , hence wP
ϕ
wµ (w), a contradiction.
Since the matching µ ∈ E (F, W, Pϕ, q) is ϕ-admissible and not blocked by any worker
or coalition, then µ is ϕ-stable.
Proof of Theorem 2:
Proof. Assume that the condition of full admissibility holds. For each firm f ∈ F, we
define the f ′s choice function as Ch f (S) = µ ( f ) such that Υ f (S) = µ for any S ⊂W.
First, we have to show that for each f ∈ F and anyS ⊂W the choice function Ch f maps
the best subset of workers in S according to the preference relation Pϕf . We know that
for anyS ⊂ W, Υ f (S) ∈ M f and Υ f (S) R∗fµ′ for all µ′ ∈ {µ ∈ M : µ ( f ) ⊂ S} ∩ M f ,
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then by definition µ ( f ) ⊂ S whenever Υ f (S) = µ. Assume that there is some subset
of workers S′ ⊂ S, such that S′Pϕf µ ( f ) for Υ f (S) = µ. Hence, the preference relation
S′Pϕf µ ( f ) implies that µ
S′
f P
∗
f µ
µ( f )
f . By the condition of full admissibility Υ f (S) = µ =
µ
µ( f )
f , since µ
S′
f = µ f ,S′ ∈ {µ ∈ M : µ ( f ) ⊂ S} ∩M f , a contradiction. Hence, µ ( f ) Rϕf S′
for all S′ ⊂ S where Υ f (S) = µ. This implies that Ch f (S) = µ ( f ) such that Υ f (S) = µ
for any S ⊂W is a well defined choice function for each firm f .
Now we have to show that the preferences profile Pϕ satisfies the condition of
q-substitutability. Suppose that w, w′ ∈ S and w ∈ µ ( f ) where Υ f (S) = µ, this
implies that w ∈ Ch f (S). By bottom q-substitutability, we know that w ∈ µ′ ( f ) where
Υ f (S {w′}) = µ′, this implies that w ∈ Ch f (S {w′}), then the preferences profile
Pϕ satisfies q-substitutability. Hence, the reduced problem (F, W, Pϕ, q) has a at least one
stable matching. Since by full admissibility any feasible matching of the problem is
ϕ-admissible, then E (F, W, P∗, q) is not empty.
Proof of Proposition 9:
Proof. Assume that the matching µ is stable in the reduced problem (F, W, Pϕ, q) but
blocked by some coalition { f , S} such that S ∈ H f in the problem (F, W, P∗, q). Hence,
µ′P∗f µ for all µ
′ ∈ ϕ f (S) implies that µSf P∗f µ while µ′′P∗wµ for all µ′′ ∈ ϕw ( f ) implies
µ
f
wP∗wµ. By assumption, µ f ,µ( f ) = µ
µ( f )
f ∈ ϕ f (µ ( f )) and µw,µ(w) = µµ(w)w ∈ ϕw (µ (w)).
Hence, µR∗fµ
µ( f )
f and µR
∗
wµ
µ(w)
w even if the matching µ is not ϕ-admissible. Then
µSf P
∗
f µ
µ( f )
f and µ
f
wP∗wµ
µ(w)
w for all w ∈ S, which imply that a) SPϕf µ ( f ) and b) f Pϕwµ (w)
for all w ∈ S, a contradiction.
Now suppose that µ is blocked by a worker w ∈W. In a similar way, we have that
µ (w) 6= w and µ′P∗wµ for all µ′ ∈ ϕw (w) which implies µwwP∗wµµ(w)w . Hence, wPϕwµ (w),
a contradiction.
Proof of Theorem 3:
Proof. Let (F, W, Pæ, q) be the reduced problem associated with (F, W, P∗, q). By the
condition of bottom q-substitutability, there exists at least one stable matching in the
reduced problem, say µ∗ ∈ E (F, W, Pæ, q).
We have to show that µ∗ is ρ-admissible. Suppose in contradiction that µ∗ /∈ρ f (µ∗ ( f ))
for some firm f ∈ F. There are two cases:
Case 1: There exists a coalition { f ′, S′} ⊂ F ∪W { f } such that S′ ∈ H f ′ , µ f ′,S′P∗f ′µ
and µw′, f ′P∗w′µ for all w
′ ∈ S′. Since agents are pessimistic, µ f ′,S′ = µS′f ′ ∈ρ f ′ (S′) and
µw′, f ′ = µ
f ′
w′ ∈ ρw′ ( f ′), then µS
′
f ′P
∗
f ′µ
µ∗( f ′)
f ′ and µ
f ′
w′P
∗
w′µ
µ∗(w′)
w′ for all w
′ ∈ S′. This implies
that S′Pρf ′µ
∗ ( f ′) and f ′Rρw′µ
∗ (w′) for all w′ ∈ S′, a contradiction.
Case 2: There exists a subset of workers S′′ ⊂W such that µw′,w′P∗w′µ for all w′ ∈ S′′.
In a similar way as before, we know that µw′,w′ = µw
′
w′ ∈ ρw′ (w′). Hence, µw
′
w′P
∗
w′µ
µ∗(w′)
w′
implies that w′Pρw′µ
∗ (w′) for all w′ ∈ S′′, a contradiction.
Given that f was any firm, this implies that µ∗ ∈ρ f (µ∗ ( f )) for all f ∈ F. A similar ar-
gument applies for any worker, then the matching µ∗ is ρ-admissible, i.e. µ∗ ∈ρa (µ∗ (a))
for all a ∈ F ∪W. Hence, the matching µ∗ is ρ-stable. This completes the proof.
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Proof of Theorem 4:
Proof. Suppose that the matching µ ∈ Eϕ (F, W, P∗, q) but µ /∈ Cϕ (F, W, P∗, q), then
there is another matching µ̂ 6= µ and one coalition A ⊂ F ∪W which blocks the
matching µ. Take any firm f ∈ A and the subset of worker µ̂ ( f ) ⊂ A, obviously
µ̂ (w) = { f } ⊂ A for all w ∈ µ̂ ( f ). It is satisfied: 1) µ′P∗f µ for all µ′ ∈ ϕ f (µ̂ ( f )) and
2) µ′′P∗wµ for all µ′′ ∈ ϕw ( f ) and all w ∈ µ̂ ( f ). Then the coalition { f , µ̂ ( f )} blocks the
matching µ. If there is no firm in the coalition A, take any worker w ∈ A, obviously
µ̂ (w) = {w} ⊂ A and it is satisfied that: 1) µ′′P∗wµ for all µ′′ ∈ ϕw (w). Hence, any
individual worker w ∈ A blocks the matching µ, a contradiction.
On the other hand, suppose that µ ∈ Cϕ (F, W, P∗, q) but µ /∈ Eϕ (F, W, P∗, q), then
there is at least a coalition, { f , S}, or an individual worker, w ∈W, which blocks the
matching µ. Set the matching µ̂, such that µ̂ ( f ) = S, obviously µ̂ 6= µ, and A = { f , S}.
By definition is satisfied: 1) µ′P∗f µ for all µ
′ ∈ ϕ f (µ̂ ( f )) and all f ∈ A and 2) µ′′P∗wµ
for all µ′′ ∈ ϕw (µ̂ (w)) and all w ∈ A, then µ /∈ Cϕ (F, W, P∗, q). Suppose that and
individual worker blocks the matching µ, set A = {w} and µ̂ (w) = w, obviously µ̂ 6= µ
and it is satisfied: 1)µ′′P∗wµ for all µ′′ ∈ ϕw (µ̂ (w)) and all w ∈ A, a contradiction. This
completes the proof.

C
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Proof of Claim 1:
Proof. Each profile of pure strategies yields a matching, hence it is enough to show
that for every profile of messages there is a profitable deviation for at least one student.
Consider any matching ν, where there is at least one unmatched agent. This implies
that there is at least one unmatched student and a hospital with an unfilled position,
say s and h. Let m be any profile of messages that yields the matching ν, and let m (s)
be the message of the student s. Since ν (h) = ∅ and any student is acceptable for
each hospital, we know that M (h) = ∅. Hence, the alternative message m′ (s) = h
is a profitable deviation for s, since the hospital h follows its dominant strategy, i.e.
Ch (M′ (h) ∪∅) = s for M′ (h) = M (h) ∪ {s}. So, only matchings with no unmatched
agents are candidates for equilibrium outcomes.
In the following list, we show the whole set of matchings with no unmatched agents.
On the right of each matching, we show a student who has a profitable deviation given
any profile of messages that yields each of these possible matchings:
Table 8: Profitable Deviations
Matching Deviation Matching Deviation
µ1 = (s1, s2, s3, s4) m′ (s4) = h2 µ13 = (s3, s1, s2, s4) m′ (s4) = h2
µ2 = (s1, s2, s4, s3) m′ (s4) = h2 µ14 = (s3, s1, s4, s2) m′ (s2) = h3
µ3 = (s1, s3, s2, s4) m′ (s2) = h4 µ15 = (s3, s2, s1, s4) m′ (s2) = h4
µ4 = (s1, s3, s4, s2) m′ (s4) = h1 µ16 = (s3, s2, s4, s1) m′ (s2) = h3
µ5 = (s1, s4, s2, s3) m′ (s2) = h4 µ17 = (s3, s4, s1, s2) m′ (s1) = h1
µ6 = (s1, s4, s3, s2) m′ (s4) = h1 µ18 = (s3, s4, s2, s1) m′ (s2) = h1
µ7 = (s2, s1, s3, s4) m′ (s4) = h1 µ19 = (s4, s1, s2, s3) m′ (s4) = h2
µ8 = (s2, s1, s4, s3) m′ (s4) = h2 µ20 = (s4, s1, s3, s2) m′ (s2) = h3
µ9 = (s2, s3, s1, s4) m′ (s2) = h4 µ21 = (s4, s2, s1, s3) m′ (s2) = h4
µ10 = (s2, s3, s4, s1) m′ (s4) = h1 µ22 = (s4, s2, s3, s1) m′ (s2) = h3
µ11 = (s2, s4, s1, s3) m′ (s2) = h4 µ23 = (s4, s3, s1, s2) m′ (s3) = h3
µ12 = (s2, s4, s3, s1) m′ (s4) = h1 µ24 = (s4, s3, s2, s1) m′ (s4) = h4
Then there is no Nash equilibrium in pure strategies.
Proof of Proposition 11:
Proof. Take any matching µ ∈ S (PH, PC), we know that there is at least one since
couples’ preferences are responsive. Consider a strategy profile such that:
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1. m (s) = µ (s) for all s ∈ S; and
2. Jh (·) = Ch (·) for all h ∈ H.
Given the profile (m, J) =
({µ (s)}s∈S , {Ch (·)}h∈H), the outcome of the OA is the
matching gOA (m, J) = µ. We show that there is no profitable deviation for any agent.
We know that Ch (·) is an optimal decision rule for each hospital, then no hospital has
a profitable deviation.
Consider any student s ∈ S, since µ is a stable matching we know that it is individu-
ally rational, then the alternative message m′ (s) = u is not a profitable deviation for
any s ∈ S such that µ (s) ∈ H.
Suppose that s ∈ S, sends a message m′ (sk) = hp such that
(
hp, µ (sl)
)
Pc (µ (sk) , µ (sl)).
Given that no other agent deviates, we know that M′ (h) = M (h) for all h 6= µ (sk) , hp.
In addition, M′ (µ (sk)) = ∅ and M′
(
hp
)
= M
(
hp
)∪ {sk}. Since µ is stable and hp ∈ H,
we know that µ
(
hp
)
Phsk, then Chp
(
M′
(
hp
))
= µ
(
hp
)
. Let ν be the outcome matching
of the mechanism given the individual deviation m′ (sk) then, ν (sk) = u and ν (sl) =
µ (sl). Since µ is individually rational, it follows that (µ (sk) , µ (sl)) Rc (u, µ (sl)). Then,
no students has a profitable deviation.
The next result is auxiliary in the characterization of the set of equilibrium outcomes
of the OA.
Lemma 4 Suppose that couples preferences are responsive, then for each couple c ∈ C and
for all h′p, h′q, hp, hq ∈ H ∪ {u} such that
(
h′p, h′q
)
6= (hq, hp), if (h′p, h′q) Pc (hp, hq) implies
either h′p sk hp or h′q sl hq.
Proof. There are three cases:
1. Assume that
(
h′p, h′q
)
6= (hq, hp) and either h′p = hq or h′q = hp. Consider with-
out lost of generality (w.l.g.) that h′q = hp and suppose that
(
h′p, h′q
)
Pc
(
hp, hq
)
(
(
h′p, hp
)
Pc
(
hp, hq
)
since h′q = hp). In contradiction, suppose that hp sk h′p and
hq sl hp. If hp = h′p then h′p = u and hp 6= hq, hence hq sl hp. By respon-
siveness, we know that
(
hp, hq
)
Pc
(
h′p, hp
)
, which is a contradiction. If hp 6= h′p
then hp sk h′p and by responsiveness
(
hp, hq
)
Pc
(
h′p, hq
)
and
(
h′p, hq
)
Rc
(
h′p, hp
)
,
hence
(
hp, hq
)
Pc
(
h′p, hp
)
a contradiction.
2. Assume that
(
h′p, h′q
)
Pc
(
hp, hq
)
and either h′p = hp or h′q = hq. Suppose w.l.g.
that h′q = hq, hence hq sk h′q. Consider in contradiction that hp sk h′p, by
responsiveness we have
(
hp, hq
)
Pc
(
h′p, h′q
)
, a contradiction.
3. Assume that h′p 6= hq, h′q 6= hp,
(
h′p, h′q
)
6= (hq, hp) and (h′p, h′q) Pc (hp, hq). Sup-
pose in contradiction that hp sk h′p and hq sl h′q, note that both preferences have
to be strict. Hence, by responsiveness hq sl h′q implies
(
h′p, hq
)
Pc
(
h′p, h′q
)
and
hp sk h′p implies
(
hp, hq
)
Pc
(
h′p, hq
)
. Hence
(
hp, hq
)
Pc
(
h′p, h′q
)
, a contradiction.
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This completes the proof.
The previous lemma is useful to prove the following result.
Proof of Proposition 12:
Proof. Suppose that the OA attains the unstable matching µ as a SPE outcome. Assume
that µ is not individually rational: If (u, µ (sl)) Pc (µ (sk) , µ (sl)) the student sk has a prof-
itable deviation with m′ (sk) = u. We have a similar case when (µ (sk) , u) Pc (µ (sk) , µ (sl)).
Consider the third possibility (u, u) Pc (µ (sk) , µ (sl)). We know that (u, u) 6= (µ (sl) , µ (sk)),
hence by Lemma 1 it is satisfied either u sk µ (sk) or u sl µ (sl). Assume w.l.g. that
u sk µ (sk), by responsiveness u sk µ (sk) implies (u, µ (sl)) Pc (µ (sk) , µ (sl)), hence
m′ (sk) = u is a profitable deviation for sk. A contradiction, hence the matching µ has
to be individually rational.
The previous argument implies that by assumption there has to exist at least one
blocking coalition, say
{
c = (sk, sl) ,
(
hp, hq
)}
. There are three possible cases:
1. Assume either hp = µ (sk) or hq = µ (sl). Consider w.l.g. that hq = µ (sl) then
m′ (sk) = hp is a profitable deviation for sk. Since no other agent deviates if
hp ∈ H, then M′
(
hp
)
= M
(
hp
) ∪ {sk} and µ (hp) ∈ M (hp). So, the hospital hp
will choose the candidate Chp
(
M′
(
hp
))
= sk which confirms that m′ (sk) = hp is
a profitable deviation for sk. A contradiction.
2. Assume that hp 6= µ (sk), hq 6= µ (sl) and
(
hp, hq
) 6= (µ (sl) , µ (sk)). By Lemma
1 (case 3), we know that
(
hp, hq
)
Pc (µ (sk) , µ (sl)) implies either hp sk µ (sk) or
hq sl µ (sl). Suppose that hp sk µ (sk), so by responsiveness
(
hp, µ (sl)
)
Pc (µ (sk) , µ (sl)).
Hence, as in the previous case the message m′ (sk) = hp is a profitable deviation
for sk. A contradiction.
3. Assume that
(
hp, hq
) 6= (µ (sl) , µ (sk)) and either hp = µ (sl) or hq = µ (sk). By
Lemma 1 (case 1),
(
hp, hq
)
Pc (µ (sk) , µ (sl)) implies either hp sk µ (sk) or hq sl
µ (sl). So, by responsiveness it is possible either
(
hp, µ (sl)
)
Pc (µ (sk) , µ (sl)) or(
µ (sk) , hq
)
Pc (µ (sk) , µ (sl)). As in previous cases, any of the students sk or sl has
a profitable deviation. A contradiction.
There is only one more possibility, the blocking coalition: {c = (sk, sl) , (µ (sl) , µ (sk))}.
However, we have already shown in Example 1 that it is easy to construct a profile of
strategies that supports this kind of instability in SPE. This completes the proof.
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